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CYBERLAW 2.0
Jacqueline D. Lipton*
Abstract
In the early days of the Internet, Judge Frank Easterbrook
famously dismissed the idea of an emerging field of cyberspace
law as akin to a “law of the horse”— a pastiche of unrelated
legal principles tied together only by virtue of applying to the
Internet, having no unifying principles that would teach us
anything meaningful. This article revisits Easterbrook’s
assertions with the benefit of hindsight. It suggests that
subsequent case law and legislative developments in fact do
support a distinct cyberlaw field. It introduces the novel
argument that cyberlaw is a global “law of the intermediated
information exchange.” In other words, online law is unified
by the fact that everything that occurs in cyberspace is an
information exchange intermediated by one or more third
parties - search engines, social networks, Internet Services
Providers etc. Thus, cyberlaw is essentially about regulating
communications amongst individuals, and apportioning
liability between communicators and those who facilitate
communication. Accepting this premise, one can identify a
foundation – and set of unifying principles - for the field. This
article advocates building up from this foundation to facilitate
the development of a more cohesive, systematic and predictable
set of rules for online governance.

INTRODUCTION
Law students in the 1990s flocked to enroll in new courses described
variously as Internet law, cyberspace law, cyberlaw, and information law,1
*

Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Research, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law, 11075 East Boulevard, Cleveland, Ohio,
44106 (Email: JDL14@case.edu). The author would like to thank Dean Lawrence
Mitchell, Professor Nancy Kim, and Professor Cassandra Robertson for comments on an
earlier draft of this article. All mistakes and omissions are, of course, my own.
1
RAYMOND KU and JACQUELINE LIPTON, CYBERSPACE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS,
16-17 (3 ed, 2010) (“The study of cyberspace law is … the study of the regulation of
information in a world interlinked and mediated by computer networks …. In other words,
the study of cyberspace law is the study of whether traditionally separate substantive laws
that dealt with information should give way to a new overarching category of information
law.”); Jacqueline Lipton, A Framework for Information Law and Policy, 82 OREGON LAW
REVIEW 695 (2003) (describing similiarities and differences between recognizing
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despite criticisms that these courses were nothing more than a cyberspace
“law of the horse”.2 Judge Frank Easterbrook had famously argued in 1996
that examination of property rights in cyberspace was no more than a
survey of disparate legal principles related only by the fact that they were
applied to the Internet.3 He likened cyberspace law to a “law of the horse”
on the basis that that field would include various principles of tort, contract
and environmental law related only by the fact that they were applied to
horses.4 There would be no distinct unifying principles grounding the
endeavor that would illuminate our thinking about the law more generally.5
Despite these criticisms, cyberlaw courses continue to be taught in law
schools around the world.6 Although the contours of the field have
remained amorphous, the idea of cyberlaw has resonated with a large group
of legal scholars.7 This article questions why cyberlaw has maintained its
traction despite Easterbrook’s criticisms, and examines whether there may,
in fact, be a unifying set of principles that underlie the field. In particular,
the article takes advantage of the years of judicial and legislative
developments since Easterbrook’s comments to consider whether more than
a decade of legal development now supports the field. In the author’s view,
new developments not only support the existence of a cyberlaw field, but
more importantly require a re-organization of the field to better encapsulate
what is unique and unifying about it.
It is easy to miss what is unifying about cyberlaw because the relevant
principles appear in different guises across a variety of legal fields, notably
“cyberlaw” and “information law” as distinct fields of study).
2
See, for example, Frank Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996) (famously arguing that cyberspace law amounted to nothing
more than a “law of the horse”).
3
KU and LIPTON, supra note 1, at 16 (explaining the “law of the horse” metaphor as
suggesting that “Internet law has no truly distinct value aside from being one of many
potential areas for applying every legal discipline from antitrust to zoning law” to the
Internet).
4
Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 207 (“the best way to learn the law applicable to
specialized endeavors is to study general rules. Lots of cases deal with sales of horses;
others deal with people kicked by horses; still more deal with the licensing and racing of
horses, or with the care veterinarians give to horses, or with prizes at horse shows. Any
effort to collect these strands into a course on ‘The Law of the Horse’ is doomed to be
shallow and to miss unifying principles”).
5
Id.
6
See, for example, Jessica Litman, List of Cyberlaw Syllabi (available at http://wwwpersonal.umich.edu/~jdlitman/classes/cyber/courses.html, last viewed on August 1, 2011).
7
So much so, in fact, that 2011 saw the inception of a new annual works in progress
conference dedicated to the cyberlaw field: http://law.scu.edu/hightech/internet-lawscholarship.cfm, last viewed on August 8, 2011.
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torts, intellectual property law, constitutional law, and criminal law. The
aim of this article is to draw key principles together to make the case for
cyberlaw. The author argues that the main concepts around which cyberlaw
might be arranged are: examining Internet intermediary liability for the
wrongful conduct of others; identifying appropriate behavioral norms
specific to online interactions; addressing jurisdictional challenges specific
to the Internet context; identifying a concept of compensable harm in online
disputes; and, as a corollary, quantifying damages for online wrongs.
These concepts derive from the underlying nature of the Internet: a
global communications medium where communications are facilitated by
intermediaries such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs), virtual world
operators, online gaming platforms, social network operators, web-hosting
services, search engines, and payments systems. What is unique about
cyberlaw is that it is the law of the intermediated information exchange.
The unifying features of cyberlaw relate to the fact that the field deals
purely with information exchanges and that those exchanges are always
facilitated by one or more intermediaries. Nothing happens online that is
not a form of intermediated information exchange. Thus, the cyberlaw field
must focus, as no other field has before, on developing principles that
regulate how we communicate with each other globally in a variety of
spheres of activity (social, commercial, artistic) utilizing intermediated
digital technologies.
Part I provides a history of cyberlaw, including prominent critiques of
the field. Part II focuses on Internet intermediary liability as a central tenet
of cyberlaw. If cyberlaw is a law of the intermediated information
exchange, the role of the intermediary must take on paramount importance.
Part III addresses online behavioral norms. Cyberspace interactions involve
different behavioral norms from those that have developed in the physical
world and the law must come to reflect those norms.8 Part IV turns to
8

Just as “real world” tort law embodies reasonableness standards (such as the
omniscient “reasonable person”) cyberlaw too should develop notions of reasonable online
conduct. However, because cyberspace interactions are pure information exchanges and do
not involve physical conduct, reasonableness standards online cannot be based on spatial
analogs drawn from the physical world. Privacy law, for example, has developed the
concept of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” based on physical doors, walls, fences,
and locks: DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, 71-74 (2008) (describing the
concept of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” as it has developed in American Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and privacy tort law) [hereinafter, Understanding Privacy].
This kind of “reasonableness” standard does not easily translate to cyberspace: Patricia
Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARVARD JOURNAL OF
LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 1, 4 (2007) (noting that traditional American conceptions of
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jurisdictional questions. It examines the extent to which cyberlaw has
required, or may yet require, a reconsideration of traditional private
international law principles. It suggests that the global nature of the Internet
– requiring a jurisdictional inquiry in a majority of cases – may lead to a
situation where jurisdictional boundaries serve routinely to bar substantive
relief to individual litigants. The author argues that more predictable ex
ante jurisdictional rules must be developed to allow for more effective
determination of substantive legal rights online.9 If the jurisdictional
hurdles can be dealt with more effectively and predictably, judges will be
able to focus more fully on developing substantive rights and remedies.
Part V examines the nature of harms and remedies online. Online harms
deriving from information exchanges are predominantly reputational,
emotional, and psychological. These kinds of harms are notably different to
the kinds of harms traditionally addressed by, say, tort and intellectual
property laws. Traditional laws have focused much more on economic
harms often deriving from physical damages to a person or her property.
The cyberlaw field needs to develop ways to identify and address harms
arising from pure information exchanges and to effectively remedy those
harms.
The author concludes in Part VI that by drawing together the issues
discussed in Parts II to V, a clearer picture of a distinct cyberlaw field
emerges, with its own set of unifying principles. While parties would
continue to litigate disputes under existing laws, development of a cyberlaw
field alongside those existing fields would facilitate the creation of more
cohesive, harmonized, and predictable rules for Internet governance.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CYBERSPACE
A. In The Beginning…
Most of us can no longer conceive of a world without the Internet, let
alone the various handheld wireless devices – smart phones, iPads, and the
like - enabling connectivity from virtually anywhere around the globe.
Nevertheless, the previous generation – including many of today’s law
professors - witnessed the birth of the Internet. Some of us still remember a
time when there was no cyberlaw course in the law school curriculum.
privacy do not translate well to the “spaceless” environment of the Internet).
9
Cassandra Robertson, The Inextricable Merits Problem in Personal Jurisdiction,
(draft on file with the author) (arguing for a clearer ex ante jurisdictional rule in Internet
defamation cases).
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Variously entitled cyberlaw, cyberspace law, or Internet law, these courses
are now a staple of most upper level curricula.
Despite the apparent permanence of cyberlaw courses, no one has yet
accurately explained the nature of the field. Cyberlaw casebooks focus
variously on topics such as copyright and trademark law, First Amendment,
privacy, jurisdictional problems, electronic contracting, regulatory
competence of domestic legislatures, and private ordering.10
It was in the face of the uncertainties surrounding the appropriate
boundaries of the field that Judge Frank Easterbrook made his famous “law
of the horse” comments at the University of Chicago.11 In remarks prepared
following an invitation to comment on property law in cyberspace, Judge
Easterbrook cited comments made by Dean Gerhard Casper, ex dean of the
University of Chicago School of Law, to the effect that Casper was proud
that Chicago did not offer a course in “the law of the horse”.12
In likening cyberspace law to a “law of the horse”, Easterbrook echoed
Casper’s concerns. Easterbrook noted specifically that courses involving
the cross-sterilization of several fields, such as law and technology, tended
to offer the worst of both worlds.13 They would be doomed to be taught by
professors who “knew little about either field”.14 Easterbrook also opined
that the most effective way to learn laws as they might apply to specialized
endeavors is to study rules of general application.15 Otherwise, any new
field that emerged would lack unifying principles that might illuminate
anything meaningful about the law more generally.16
Easterbrook’s comments were met with a variety of responses defending
the existence of cyberspace law from a number of conceptual perspectives.
In a well known response to Easterbrook in the Harvard Law Review,
Professor Lawrence Lessig argued that cyberlaw did, in fact, illuminate the
10

See, for example, KU and LIPTON, supra note 1; MARK LEMLEY, PETER MENELL,
ROBERT MERGES and PAMELA SAMUELSON, SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW (3 ed, 2006);
GERALD R. FERRERA, STEPHEN D. LICHTENSTEIN, MARGO E. K. REDER, ROBERT BIRD and
WILLIAM T. SCHIANO, CYBERLAW: TEXT AND CASES (2003); PETER MAGGS, JOHN SOMA
and JAMES SPROWL, INTERNET AND COMPUTER LAW: CASES – COMMENTS – QUESTIONS
(2ed, 2005).
11
Easterbrook, supra note 2.
12
Id., at 207.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id., at 207-8.
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entire law, although not in the way described by Easterbrook.17 Lessig
acknowledged that cyberlaw might be conceived as a series of disconnected
tort, contract, and intellectual property problems as a matter of substance.18
However, he noted that: “there is an important general point that comes
from thinking in particular about how law and cyberspace connect.”19 This
general point was not about the substance of the law as it might be applied
in cyberspace, but rather about the limits on law as a regulator.20
Lessig utilized this insight as a springboard for his well-known work
that examines the application of a number of regulatory modalities in both
real space and in cyberspace. These modalities include law, social norms,
markets, and architecture.21 In his subsequent work, he has focused on the
significance of system architecture, or software code, as the key regulatory
modality for cyberspace.22 Lessig’s insight was that online behavior can be
more or less completely and almost perfectly regulated by software code to
an extent that the law could never achieve.23
Professor Raymond Ku took a slightly different approach to
Easterbrook’s concerns. While agreeing that one could regard cyberspace
law as an intersection of a variety of different fields, Ku suggested that
cyberspace law nevertheless does potentially “illuminate the entire law”. 24
17

Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 501 (1999) [hereinafter, What Cyberlaw Might Teach].
18
Id, at 502 (“Courses in law school, Easterbrook argued, ‘should be limited to
subjects that could illuminate the entire law.’ ‘[T]he best way to learn the law applicable to
specialized endeavors,’ he argued, ‘is to study general rules.’ This ‘the law of cyberspace,’
conceived of as torts in cyberspace, contracts in cyberspace, property in cyberspace, etc.,
was not.”)
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id., at 503-504 (identifying these four modalities of regulation in both physical
world and cyberspace contexts).
22
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2 ed, 2006) [hereinafter, CODE 2.0].
23
Lessig, What Cyberlaw Might Teach, supra note 17, at 514 (“I argued that whether
cyberspace can be regulated is not a function of Nature. It depends, instead, upon its
architecture, or its code. Its regulability, that is, is a function of its design.”); Joel
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through
Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 555 (1998) (“This Article argues, in essence, that the set
of rules for information flows imposed by technology and communication networks form a
‘Lex Informatica’ that policymakers must understand, consciously recognize, and
encourage”); 556 (“policymakers can and should look to Lex Informatica as a useful extralegal instrument that may be used to achieve objectives that otherwise challenge
conventional laws and attempts by governments to regulate across jurisdictional lines”).
24
Raymond Ku, Foreword: A Brave New Cyberworld?, 22 T. JEFFERSON L. REV 125,
127-128 (2000) (“As lawyers, judges, lawmakers, and scholars, we have an obligation to
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Ku argued that it was imperative to apply real world laws online to see
whether they were effective in that context. In so doing, the opportunity
would arise to question fundamental legal principles as they have applied in
the pre-Internet world.25
Despite the flurry of heated debate in the immediate wake of
Easterbrook’s comments, no one has seriously tackled questions about the
fundamental nature of cyberlaw since the 1990s. Cyberlaw courses and
casebooks continue to comprise piecemeal collections of legal principles –
tort, contract, antitrust, intellectual property, constitutional law, etc. – as
applied to the Internet. An examination of these current approaches to
cyberlaw suggests that Easterbrook’s concerns may have been wellfounded.
No serious attempts have been made to identify and develop what may
be unique about cyberlaw as a field of study since the 1990s. In the
meantime, other important areas of cyberlaw scholarship have evolved,
including a body of literature about the extent to which spatial metaphors
derived from the physical world could – or should – be meaningfully
applied to cyberspace.26 Another ongoing debate has focused on the
regulatory competence of domestic governments over the Internet.27 This
debate ultimately led to the coining of the term “cyberspace
exceptionalism,” referring to the view that traditional domestic governments
cannot meaningfully regulate cyberspace and that new systems of regulation

examine the law and cyberspace and to take part in the discourse on how our cyberworld
will be regulated. While Judge Easterbrook is clearly right that this effort requires a
general understanding of the laws of intellectual property, antitrust, or the First
Amendment, I disagree with his conclusion that the study of cyberspace does not
‘illuminate the entire law.’”)
25
Id., at 129 (“pioneering our cyberworld and determining the rules and laws that will
govern, forces us to examine our pre-cyberworld rules as well as our commitment to the
values that form the foundation for those laws”).
26
See, for example, John Perry Barlow, Cyberspace Declaration of Independence
(1996) (available at https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html, last viewed on
August 1, 2011); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital
Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439 (2003); Mark Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL.
L. REV. 521 (2003); Jacqueline Lipton, Mixed Metaphors in Cyberspace: Property in
Information and Information Systems, 35 U. CHI. L. J. 235 (2003); Julie Cohen, Cyberspace
As/And Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007).
27
See, for example, JACK GOLDSMITH and TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET:
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2008) (arguing that national governments can and
do regulate cyberspace effectively); DAVID POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE:
NOTES ON THE STUDY OF CYBERSPACE (2009) (arguing against domestic governments
regulating cyberspace).
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must be developed for online conduct.28
Important as these subsequent debates unquestionably have been, they
do not answer fundamental questions about the nature and contours of
cyberlaw as a legal field. The way in which one approaches these other
debates will impact the answers to some of the questions posed in this
article. However, the focus of this discussion is on examining legal
developments in cyberspace to tease out unifying threads that will enable us
to map the contours of a distinct cyberlaw field.
B. The Nature of Cyberspace: Global Intermediated Information Exchange
The key features of the Internet that effectively form the cornerstones of
the following discussion are the fact that: (a) all online conduct involves
information exchange;29 (b) all online communications are facilitated by
one or more Internet intermediaries such as ISPs, search engines, gaming
platforms, and payments systems; and, (c) most online interaction has at
least the potential for global reach.
No one can go online or participate in online interactions without
contracting with an ISP. Once online, the Internet experience is only
meaningful when one engages in interactions such as online games, social
networks, virtual worlds, electronic commerce, or searching for items of
interest.
All of these interactions involve intermediaries such as
Facebook,30 Flickr,31 MySpace,32 Shutterfly,33 Amazon,34 Google35 etc.
28

David Post, Governing Cyberspace: Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 883 (2008) (contrasting cyberspace “exceptionalists” and cyberspace
“unexceptionalist” with respect to their respective views about cyberspace regulation)
29
The information exchange is made possible by hardware and by electrons passing
through cables, but my suggested focus for cyberlaw is on the informational qualities of the
exchange rather than the hardware. A good discussion of confusion between hardware and
content-based analyses of the Internet that plagued early discussions of Internet law can be
found in: Orin Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357 (2003).
30
Facebook is a popular online social networking service. See www.facebook.com,
last viewed on August 1, 2011.
31
Flickr is an online photo-sharing service. See www.flickr.com, last viewed on
August 1, 2011.
32
MySpace is a social networking service and forum for sharing popular culture. See
www.myspace.com, last viewed on August 1, 2011.
33
Shutterfly is an electronic business engaging in printing photographs and associated
merchandise for customers as well as providing platforms for sharing photographs. See
www.shutterfly.com, last viewed on August 1, 2011.
34
Amazon.com is an iconic early experiment in electronic commerce that started as a
book and music retailer online and has grown to expand into various different kinds of
online marketplaces. See www.amazon.com, last viewed on August 1, 2011.
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Internet intermediaries appear at many points within the online experience,
and they are necessary to enable all online experiences.
Online interactions are basically exchanges of information amongst
individuals. The information exchanges may be very sophisticated, such as
the avatars36 in Second Life37 interacting with each other within a virtual
environment. However, no physical interactions ever take place between
real people online. Even cybersex – the cyberspace analog of the most
intimate of physical acts - does not involve actual physical contact between
individuals.
The fact that everything on the Internet may be described as an
intermediated information exchange ultimately sets the parameters for
cyberlaw, and sets cyberlaw apart as a distinct legal field. Understanding
cyberlaw means understanding the nature and regulation of an information
exchange involving more than just the originator and the recipient of a
communication. To understand cyberlaw, one must understand the nature
of the relationships between principal actors in an information exchange, as
well as their relationships to those who facilitate their exchange. One must
also recognize harms and damages that result from communications as
opposed to physical conduct. Online harms are likely to implicate a
victim’s reputation and mental or emotional well-being, rather than causing
physical or economic damage.
One must further consider the impact of the global nature of the Internet
on all of these issues. As most Internet disputes have the potential to raise
jurisdictional concerns, it is likely that the prominence of jurisdictional
issues may detract from the development of substantive legal rules. An
associated challenge in recognizing the bounds of cyberlaw is to identify
appropriate behavioral norms online, and to appreciate the extent to which
online norms differ from norms of the physical world. Where individual
actors are confronted with a computer screen rather than a physical person,
35

Google is probably the world’s leading search engine. See www.google.com, last
viewed on August 1, 2011.
36
Second Life, Definition of Avatar (“In a virtual world, an avatar is a digital persona
that you can create and customize.”, see http://secondlife.com/whatis/avatar/?lang=en-US,
last viewed on August 1, 2011. Urban Dictionary defines “avatar” as: “An icon which
represents a user in a virtual reality/Internet setting, currently attempted with varying
success.
The
term
is
adopted
from
Neal
Stephenson.”
See
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=avatar, last viewed on August 1, 2011.
37
Wikipedia, Second Life (“Second Life is an online virtual world developed by
Linden
Lab
which
was
launched
on
June
23,
2003.”),
see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Life, last viewed on August 1, 2011.
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those actors are bound to behave differently – and may be expected to
behave differently – than they would in a physical interaction.38 The
distinctive qualities of cyberlaw that have been identified in this Part are
fleshed out in Parts II to V. The initial focus in Part II is on the key role of
Internet intermediaries to the development of a meaningful cyberlaw field.
II. INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES: THE LAW OF THE MIDDLEMEN
A. With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility
Internet intermediaries are the backbone of Internet interactions.
Without intermediaries, no one could go online or do much of anything by
way of online activity. Intermediaries thus play a powerful and important
role. Where one intermediary holds a dominant position in a relevant niche
– such as Google for online searching or Facebook for social networking –
the power of that intermediary may warrant significant concern and
scrutiny.39
Defining the role of Internet intermediaries in terms of their legal
responsibilities towards others must be a central focus of cyberlaw. The
power of intermediaries is not restricted to their ability to control access to
their services through passwords and other encryption technologies.
Intermediaries are also able to control the user experience by controlling the
underlying software code.40 An avatar in Second Life can only be – and do
- what the software will support. Initially, Second Life did not provide skin
38

Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky and Thomas Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous
Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L REV 1537, 1575 (2007) (“Studies show that even when an
Internet user is not anonymous and knows the recipient of his e-mail message, the speaker
is more likely to be disinhibited when engaged in ‘computer mediated communication’
than in other types of communications. The technology separates the speaker from the
immediate consequences of her speech, perhaps (falsely) lulling her to believe that there
will be no consequences. Since the Internet magnifies the number of anonymous speakers,
it also magnifies the likelihood of false and abusive speech.”); ROBIN BARNES,
OUTRAGEOUS INVASIONS: CELEBRITIES’ PRIVATE LIVES, MEDIA, AND THE LAW, 35 (2010)
(“Mass electronic communication eliminates the self-censorship that normally occurs when
dealing with an individual or communicating face-to-face.”)
39
See, for example, JANET LOWE, GOOGLE SPEAKS: SECRETS OF THE WORLD’S
GREATEST BILLIONAIRE ENTREPRENEURS, SERGEY BRIN AND LARRY PAGE, 10 (2009)
(noting that as Google gained market share and power, it also gained negative publicity for
becoming too powerful); Facebook has attracted much criticism for its lack of privacy
protections for users. See, for example, Rory Cellan-Jones, Facebook Faces Criticism on
Privacy
Change,
BBC
News,
Dec
10,
2009
(available
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8405334.stm, last viewed on August 1, 2011).
40
See supra note 22.
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colors for avatars outside the Caucasian range. The game now supports the
creation of alternative tones – or “skins”41 - for participants who want their
avatars to appear as African American, Native American, or Asian, for
example. But presumably if Linden Laboratories, the creators of Second
Life, objected to the creation of different skin colors, they could disable
features of the software that allow users to create such skins.
This Part considers the role of Internet intermediaries, and outlines some
of the key issues about intermediary liability and responsibility that should
be central to cyberlaw. It considers the extent to which intermediaries are
appropriately held liable for direct infringements of legal rights in areas
such as defamation, privacy, copyright, and trademark law. It also
examines the challenging questions of where to set the boundaries for
secondary liability of intermediaries with respect to wrongs committed by
others. Finally, it examines other obligations that may be owed by
intermediaries to victims of online wrongs, such as the obligation to identify
primary wrongdoers for the purposes of legal proceedings.
B. Direct Versus Indirect Liability for Online Wrongs
The power and prominence of intermediaries underscore the importance
of appropriately regulating these entities. By the same token, it is important
that intermediaries, particularly those providing novel services, are not
over-regulated to the point that online innovation is chilled. Lawmakers are
faced with difficult questions involving the regulation of powerful, and
often extremely innovative, intermediaries. These questions include
determining when an intermediary should be held liable for harmful online
conduct either as a direct participant (primary infringer) or as a facilitator
(secondary infringer).
While questions of intermediary liability comprise many pages in most
cyberlaw casebooks, these pages tend to be scattered throughout different
chapters. Questions about intermediary liability for copyright infringement
will be discussed in a chapter about copyright law, while intermediary
liability for defamation and privacy will typically be discussed in a free
speech, privacy, or general tort chapter. While one aim of this article is to
support a cyberlaw field, another important goal is to re-organize the field
to better reflect legal developments over the last decade or so. It may make
sense in the future for discussions of intermediary liability to be considered
together across all relevant fields of law – copyright, trademark,
41

See http://secondlife.com/destinations/fashion/skins, last viewed on August 1, 2011
(demonstrating ways to customize skin and body shapes in Second Life).
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defamation, privacy, bullying, harassment etc. This would allow synergies
between existing fields to be identified. It would further facilitate the
development of more meaningful, harmonized, and predictable legal rules.
It is increasingly difficult to ascertain whether an intermediary should
be held primarily, or rather secondarily, liable for many online wrongs.
Where a wrong is committed in the physical world – such as theft,
conversion, negligence, or battery – the identity of the primary wrongdoer is
usually readily apparent, and it is usually not an intermediary. Even if a
third party intermediary facilitates the wrong, the actual wrongdoer is
typically easy to distinguish from that third party. If I steal from you and
deposit the proceeds of the theft into my bank account, the bank may be
secondarily liable for some aspects of my conduct42 and may be subject to a
garnishment order in relation to the stolen funds.43 However, it is clear that
the bank – the intermediary or middleman – is not the primary wrongdoer.
The bank might be at most complicit in my primary wrongdoing depending
on its level of knowledge of, or participation in, my wrongful conduct.
Online, however, it is often difficult to discern who is most
appropriately described as the primary wrongdoer. In a recent trademark
case involving keyword advertising, for example, it was not clear whether
the Netscape search engine should be regarded as a primary or rather a
secondary infringer.44 Netscape’s advertising system allowed its paying
advertisers to link their advertisements to terms pre-identified by Netscape
as common search terms in the advertiser’s field. Thus, a dog food
company might pay to have its advertisements keyed to search results when
an Internet user enters a search query related to dogs.45
The plaintiff in this case – Playboy Enterprises – complained that
Netscape had included its trademarked terms “playboy” and “playmate” for

42

William Blair, Secondary Liability of Financial Institutions for the Fraud of Third
Parties, 30 HONG KONG L.J. 74 (2000) (noting the basis upon which secondary liability is
often imposed on banks and financial institutions in British-based common law systems).
43
Allen Myers, Untangling the Safety Net: Protecting Federal Benefits from Freezes,
Fees, and Garnishment, 66 WASH & LEE L. REV. 371, 375-380 (2009) (explaining the basis
and nature of a typical garnishment order filed against a bank).
44
Playboy Enterprises v Netscape, 354 F. 3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
45
Id. at 1022-1023 (“Keying allows advertisers to target individuals with certain
interests by linking advertisements to pre-identified terms. To take an innocuous example,
a person who searches for a term related to gardening may be a likely customer for a
company selling seeds. Thus, a seed company may pay to have its advertisement displayed
when searchers enter terms related to gardening.”)
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keying advertisements related to sex and adult entertainment.46 It was not
clear on the face of some of the resulting advertisements whether they were
officially related to the plaintiff’s business.47 Thus, the Internet user
clicking on the ad could potentially be confused as to whether it was dealing
with Playboy or an unaffiliated entity providing similar services. A
successful infringement action requires consumers of a product or service to
be confused about the source of that product or service.48 Playboy thus
claimed infringement with respect to the confusing advertisements keyed to
the terms “playboy” and “playmate”.
While ultimately holding Netscape liable for infringement, the court
was unsure about whether Netscape was a direct infringer or a secondary
infringer.49 In many ways, secondary liability for Internet intermediaries
makes the most sense. Intermediaries, by definition, are third parties who
facilitate activities between principal actors. If one of the principals
commits a wrong, then it would be logical to suppose that the intermediary
would generally be at most secondarily liable.
However, online the lines are blurred largely because the intermediaries
control the software code. If Netscape codes its keyword advertising
software in a certain way and advertisers choose from keywords preselected by Netscape, should Netscape face primary liability because of its
control over the functionality of the system? The Netscape court did not
resolve the issue of primary versus secondary liability, holding that
Netscape was liable for infringement on one basis or the other and that there
was no need to determine which.50 One could easily argue either way. It is
easy to suggest that the advertisers competing with the plaintiff were
primarily liable for infringements because they were the ones who drafted
the confusing ads that were then keyed to the plaintiff’s trademarks.
Alternatively, one could argue that Netscape should be primarily liable
46

Id., at 1022-1023 (describing the nature of the plaintiff’s claim).
Id., at 1023 (“[Plaintiff] introduced evidence that the adult-oriented banner ads
displayed on defendants’ search results pages are often graphic in nature and are
confusingly labeled or not labeled at all.”)
48
Id., at 1024 (“The ‘core element of trademark infringement,’ the likelihood of
confusion, lies at the center of this case.”).
49
Id. (“the parties dispute whether a direct or a contributory theory of liability applies
to defendants’ actions. We conclude that defendants are potentially liable under one theory
and that we need not decide which one.”)
50
Id. (“Whether the defendants are directly or merely contributorily liable proves to
be a tricky question. However, we need not decide that question here. We conclude that
defendants are either directly or contributorily liable. Under either theory, [plaintiff’s] case
may proceed. Thus, we need not decide this issue.”)
47
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because of its choice of the keywords it coded into the system.
While the basis of Netscape’s liability did not have much practical
impact in this decision, there will be cases in which determination of the
nature of an intermediary’s liability will have a significant impact on the
outcome. In the more recent Cartoon Network case involving copyright
infringement claims the court considered whether the provider of a digital
video recorder (DVR) was primarily or secondarily liable for content copied
to its servers at the request of its customers.51 This issue simply could not
have arisen in the pre-digital world of video recording. In the days of
Betamax and VHS recorders, it was clear that any primary infringements –
unauthorized copies – were made by owners of video recorders. The
providers of the copying technology were not involved in the primary
infringements. They did not decide which programs were recorded, when,
or how often. They did not even know what programs were being recorded
by their customers. They merely provided the technology that enabled the
copying. The Supreme Court in 1984 considered whether Sony as the
manufacturer of the Betamax video tape recorder might be held liable for
infringements of copyrighted works carried out by its customers. However,
it could only potentially have been secondarily liable as Sony itself did not
conduct any copying.52
New digital technology enables the copying process to occur remotely
over a network. The DVR service in Cartoon Network mimicked the
functionality of an old-fashioned analog video recorder, but in practice
worked quite differently. As with a set-top video recorder, the DVR service
provided by the defendant – Cablevision – to its customers allowed
customers to record programs from the television. However, unlike analog
recorders, Cablevision’s service enabled copies to be made remotely and
stored on Cablevision’s servers.53 Thus, Cablevision itself physically made
the infringing copies of protected television programs, but at its customers’
request.54
The Cartoon Network court held that Cablevision was not a direct
infringer of the defendants’ copyrights.55 According to the court, if there
51

Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings, 536 F. 3d 121 (2008).
Sony v Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that manufacturers of
Betamax video recorders were not liable for copying conducted by their customers as the
customers were making fair uses of the copyrighted material).
53
Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings, 536 F. 3d 121, 124-125 (2008) (describing the
operation of Cablevision’s remote DVR system).
54
Id
55
Id., at 133 (“We conclude only that on the facts of this case, copies produced by the
52
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was any infringement, it was the users of the service who effectively made
the copies by ordering Cablevision’s servers to record them.56 These users
were unlikely to be held liable as direct infringers because of the Sony
decision. In Sony, the Supreme Court had held that television audiences did
not infringe copyrights when they recorded programs for later viewing.57
This practice was labeled “time shifting” and was considered by a majority
of the Court to be a fair use of the copyrighted work.58 Assuming that
Cablevision’s customers were largely engaged in time-shifting, there would
be no primary infringement for which Cablevision could be secondarily
liable.59
While this reasoning makes sense in practice, the Cartoon Network
court went to great lengths to avoid holding Cablevision liable as a direct
infringer. As Cablevision in fact did make the actual copies of the protected
works, and as copyright infringement is a strict liability wrong,60 it would
seem on first impression that Cablevision should have been held primarily
liable. It was only by reading a volition requirement into copyright
infringement that the court was able to avoid this result.61 Following an
RS-DVR system are ‘made’ by the RS-DVR customer, and Cablevision's contribution to
this reproduction by providing the system does not warrant the imposition of direct
liability.”)
56
Id.
57
Sony v Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (“One may search the
Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected representatives of the millions of people
who watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing
at home, or have enacted a flat prohibition against the sale of machines that make such
copying possible.”)
58
Id., at 454 (“we must conclude that this record amply supports the District Court's
conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use”).
59
Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings, 536 F. 3d 121, 130 (2008) (“The question is who
made this copy. If it is Cablevision, plaintiffs' theory of direct infringement succeeds; if it
is the customer, plaintiffs' theory fails because Cablevision would then face, at most,
secondary liability, a theory of liability expressly disavowed by plaintiffs.”)
60
JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU, 13 (2011)
(“copyright law is a strict liability regime with no mens rea requirement for liability”).
61
Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings, 536 F. 3d 121, 131 (2008) (“When there is a
dispute as to the author of an allegedly infringing instance of reproduction, Netcom and its
progeny direct our attention to the volitional conduct that causes the copy to be made.
There are only two instances of volitional conduct in this case: Cablevision's conduct in
designing, housing, and maintaining a system that exists only to produce a copy, and a
customer's conduct in ordering that system to produce a copy of a specific program. In the
case of a VCR, it seems clear-and we know of no case holding otherwise-that the operator
of the VCR, the person who actually presses the button to make the recording, supplies the
necessary element of volition, not the person who manufactures, maintains, or, if distinct
from the operator, owns the machine. We do not believe that an RS-DVR customer is
sufficiently distinguishable from a VCR user to impose liability as a direct infringer on a
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earlier Internet intermediary precedent,62 the court started chipping away at
the strict liability basis of copyright infringement in order to reach the
desired result.
Identifying the nature of an intermediary’s liability for online wrongs
raises a number of important challenges. Lawmakers must be aware of the
need to check the power held by online gatekeepers when wrongs are
committed, but at the same time avoid over-regulating and thereby chilling
technological innovation. The intermediary’s power stems from the nature
of the Internet as a mode of intermediated information exchange.
Intermediaries control access to information as well as the code that enables
users to engage in online activities.
However, that power in itself does not always justify the imposition of
primary liability. As in the Cartoon Network case, sometimes a court will
promote technological innovation by avoiding a finding of primary liability.
Questions of primary versus secondary liability for intermediaries come up
again and again in different contexts online.63 This fact suggests a need to
focus on the legal responsibilities of intermediaries within a cohesive
cyberlaw field, rather than in disparate areas of the law such as copyright,
trademark, defamation, and privacy.

different party for copies that are made automatically upon that customer's command.”)
See also discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, Cyberspace, Exceptionalism, and the Role of
Intent in Copyright Infringement, 13 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF ENTERTAINMENT &
TECHNOLOGY LAW 767, 791 (2011) (“The Cartoon Network court employed an approach
adopted in at least one earlier Internet case involving individual copying that had been
enabled by an Internet service provider. The earlier case had imposed a ‘volition’
requirement in the context of direct infringement. In other words, the plaintiff needed to
prove that the defendant’s conduct was volitional rather than a largely automated
technological process. This volition requirement may be seen as a judicial gloss on strict
liability to accommodate technological innovation.”) [hereinafter, Cyberspace
Exceptionalism].
62
Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings, 536 F. 3d 121, 130 (2008), citing Religious
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications Services, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
63
Playboy Enterprises v Netscape, 354 F. 3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussion of
primary versus secondary liability of search engine in the trademark infringement context);
Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings, 536 F. 3d 121, 130 (2008) (discussion of primary versus
secondary liability of video recording service provider in the copyright infringement
context); Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v Roommate.com, 521 F. 3d 1157
(9th Cir. 2008) (discussing whether an online housemate matching service could be held
primarily liability for content posted by customers that allegedly infringed fair housing
legislation).
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C. Intermediary Secondary Liability
Even within the context of secondary liability, lawmakers face
challenges about the appropriate scope of intermediary liability for online
wrongs committed by others. In the early days of the Internet, legal
questions about intermediary liability tended to revolve around ISPs that
provided bulletin boards and other basic communications forums.64 Courts
were asked whether providers of such forums could be held liable for
communications posted by their members and, if so, on what basis.65 The
most common claims in the late 1990s related to defamation and copyright
infringement.66
In the absence of a unified cyberlaw field, courts considered ISP
liability purely from the point of view of the field of law from which the
claim arose: defamation or copyright. Little thought was given to the
overarching impact of the principles of intermediary liability on the
development of online law more generally. In other words, lawmakers may
have missed significant critical points in the development of Internet law to
ensure a systematic consideration of principles of Internet intermediary
liability and to develop coherent principles to guide intermediaries in their
future conduct. The law on ISP liability for defamation and copyright
evolved, first through common law, and later through legislation, in a
piecemeal fashion. Today it is difficult to reconcile the principles of ISP
liability for defamation with those of ISP liability for copyright
infringement.
In early defamation cases, for example, courts generally exempted ISPs
from liability for defamatory comments posted by others provided that the
ISP had not itself exercised significant editorial control over the content
64

Cubby v Compuserve, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (considering liability of
ISP for allegedly defamatory content posted by its customers); Stratton Oakmont v
Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. May 24, 1995) (considering liability of ISP for
allegedly defamatory comments posted by customers); Playboy Enterprises v Frena, 839 F.
Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (considering liability of bulletin board operator for copyright
infringements of those posting on the bulletin board); Religious Technology Center v
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (considering extent to which ISP and operator
of bulletin board service could be held liable for copyright infringements of those posting
information on the bulletin board)
65
Cubby v Compuserve, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (considering liability of
ISP for allegedly defamatory content posted by its customers); Stratton Oakmont v
Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. May 24, 1995) (considering liability of ISP for
allegedly defamatory comments posted by customers).
66
See supra, note 64.
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posted.67 This soon proved problematic because it effectively penalized
ISPs who were attempting to “do the right thing” and censor inappropriate
conduct. The more active the ISP was in, say, protecting children from
harmful material, the more likely it would be to attract legal liability.68 ISPs
that turned a blind eye to communications they facilitated were more likely
to escape legal liability than those that were more pro-active about
monitoring content.69
Congress eventually intervened, enacting § 230 of the Communications
Decency Act (CDA). This section, in relevant part, provides that: “No
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.”70 Courts interpreted this provision as almost a blanket
immunity for ISPs for any defamatory comments posted by others.71 ISPs
were exempted from liability even in situations where they were complicit
in the posting of defamatory or harmful content. In one case, an ISP was
exempted from liability even though it had contracted with a columnist to
contribute provocative content that it knew was likely to be at least
occasionally defamatory.72 In another case, an ISP was held to be immune
where it had been made aware of damaging false comments and had failed
to remove them in a timely fashion.73 To date, ISPs have only been held
liable as information content providers under § 230 where they have

67

Cubby v Compuserve, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (ISP not liable for
defamatory content posted by others); Stratton Oakmont v Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710
(N.Y. Sup. May 24, 1995) (ISP was liable for comments posted by others because it was
said to have exercised significant control over content through its family friendly
monitoring practices).
68
Stratton Oakmont v Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. May 24, 1995) (holding
family friendly ISP liable for allegedly defamatory comments posted by customers because
of its attempts to monitor content, suggesting it should have controlled content more
effectively).
69
Id., at 13 (“PRODIGY's conscious choice, to gain the benefits of editorial control,
has opened it up to a greater liability than CompuServe and other computer networks that
make no such choice.”)
70
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
71
David Lukmire, Can the Courts Take the Communications Decency Act? The
Reverberations of Zeran v America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371, 372 (2010)
(“Over the years, state and federal courts have interpreted section 230 expansively,
conferring a broad immunity upon website operators that host third-party content. The
statute has grown into a ‘judicial oak,’ with impacts far beyond its language sounding in
defamation law and its original intent to prevent the nascent Internet from becoming a ‘red
light district.’”)
72
Blumenthal v Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
73
Zeran v America Online, 129 F. 3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).

9-Aug-11]

CYBERLAW 2.0

19

actually written the relevant content themselves,74 rather than having
contracted with another to write it.
The current position on ISP liability for defamation and other harmful
speech differs dramatically from the position on ISP liability for copyright
infringement. Initially, when Internet users posted copyrighted content on
bulletin boards, courts struggled to determine whether the ISPs that
provided the speech forums should be held liable for those infringements.75
Ultimately, Congress stepped in to ensure that ISPs were not held liable for
copyright infringement when they were acting as mere conduits or
repositories for the postings of others.76
Congress enacted the Online Copyright Infringement Liability
Limitation Act (OCILLA) as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
of 1998. OCILLA provides a safe harbor for direct ISP liability in the case
of non-volitional or non-willful copying: in other words, copying that
occurs as part of a purely technical or mechanical process and that was
initiated by another person.77 The statute also exempts ISPs from secondary
liability where the ISP had no actual or constructive knowledge of the
infringement, had not directly benefited from the infringement, and had
responded expeditiously to a request to remove infringing content.78
The ISP safe harbors for defamation and copyright were enacted around
the same time.79 However, the respective statutes take quite different
approaches. This result is not surprising as the drafters of OCILLA were
focused on amending the copyright act for the digital age, while the drafters
of the CDA were dealing with a broader statute about protecting children
from harmful material online.80 Both statutes would have been incredibly
challenging to draft, particularly in the early days of the Internet when it
74

Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v Roommate.com, 521 F. 3d 1157
(9 Cir. 2008) (but note that this was not a defamation case, but rather a case involving
alleged infringements of fair housing legislation).
75
Playboy Enterprises v Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (considering ISP
liability for copyright infringement); Religious Technology Center v Netcom, 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (considering copyright infringement liability of ISP and bulletin
board operator).
76
17 U.S.C. § 512.
77
17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
78
17 U.S.C. § 512(c). The statute also exempted ISPs from liability for system
caching ie temporary housing of copies of digital information: 15 U.S.C. § 512(b).
79
Section 230 of the CDA was enacted in 1996 while OCILLA was enacted in 1998.
80
Lukmire, supra note 71, at 373-378 (describing the legislative history of the
Communications Decency Act as being an attempt to constitutionally incentivize website
operators to police the Internet and to prevent minors from accessing harmful content).
th
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was unclear how relevant technologies would ultimately develop and how
people would use them.
Nonetheless, there were significant commonalities between what the
drafters were trying to do, at least in the case of the ISP safe harbor
provisions. Drafters of both statutes were faced with the emerging role of
the Internet intermediary and questions about the impact of imposing
liability upon intermediaries for wrongs committed by others. However,
each drafting group understandably focused on its own brief with no
broader focus on the Internet’s development more generally. This is where
the acceptance of a cyberlaw field may have been helpful. It would have
provided an obvious theoretical framework for discussions of important
policy issues across disparate disciplines that raise significant
commonalities online.
In the final analysis, it is possible to reconcile the approaches taken by
Congress respectively in OCILLA and in § 230 of the CDA, although the
reconciliation may be somewhat unsatisfying and is basically an ex post
facto rationalization. For example, one might argue that it is easier for an
ISP to have knowledge of a copyright infringement than of the veracity of a
defamation claim because copyrights are generally registered81 and because
OCILLA requires the claimant to give detailed notice to the ISP of a
copyright claim.82 Thus, it is arguably reasonable to hold ISPs liable for
copyright infringement on the basis of notice but to largely exempt them
from defamation liability regardless of notice. It is at least theoretically
much easier for an ISP to make a reasonable judgment about the veracity of
a copyright claim than about the bona fides of a defamation claim.
Of course, one could argue that if an ISP is not in a good position to
make decisions about the merits of a defamation claim, then the ISP should
err on the side of protecting the claimant’s reputation and should be
exposed to liability if it fails to act. However, this opens an ISP up to
potentially frivolous claims that cannot be easily verified. If the ISP is
required to act on each claim by removing offending material – or at least
investigating the merits - the resulting costs may be prohibitive. There is no
easy way for an ISP to determine whether posted comments are defamatory
or not, as opposed to a copyright claim where registration of a copyright is
at least prima facie evidence of its validity.83
81

TEHRANIAN, supra note 60, at 98 (noting the necessity of registering copyrighted
works in the United States in order to obtain meaningful judicial relief for infringement).
82
17 U.S.C. §(c)(3)(A).
83
MARHSALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW, 273(5 ed, 2010) (noting
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At the end of the day, the ISP is put in the unenviable position of either
erring on the side of facilitating the free flow of ideas online or of
monitoring and policing content. Where the content involves rights that can
be verified by the ISP, the ISP might legitimately be required to act to
protect those interests. However, where the content involves pure speech
which may damage a person’s reputation, but which may or may not be
defamatory, the ISP is not in as good a position to make a determination
about the merits. Thus, Congress and the courts effectively made the
decision to exempt the ISP from most liability in the defamation area, and
to promote free speech and technological innovation. This result puts
aggrieved parties in the position of having to sue the primary infringer - the
person who actually wrote the allegedly defamatory content.
One might criticize the different approaches taken between OCILLA
and § 230 of the CDA. In fact, it is interesting that there is so little
commentary on the comparison in current literature. In both defamation
and copyright claims, ISPs have been put into the position of making
difficult decisions about whether or not to act in the face of a complaint. In
both cases they have had to examine the extent to which they might be
regarded as complicit in the alleged wrong. And in both cases they have
been put in the position of making decisions that impact on free expression:
that is, to remove content and risk being criticized for censorship or to allow
allegedly infringing content and risk being sued as complicit in the
commission of an online wrong. However, Congress acted in a way that
misses these synergies, taking one approach with respect to copyrights and
another with respect to defamation and other harmful content.
A renewed focus on cyberlaw as a legitimate field would create a
policy-oriented space for debates about commonalities between apparently
disparate areas of law like defamation and copyright, as applied online.
This would be a useful development particularly in the area of intermediary
liability for content created or posted by others. There is an urgent need for
a theoretical framework within which to engage in discussions of
intermediary liability. New issues of intermediary liability are constantly
arising, often requiring novel applications of legal principles.84
that registration of a copyright “confers prima facie evidence of the validity of the
copyright”).
84
LOWE, supra note 39, at 213 (“From patent, copyright, and trademark infringement
to click fraud to wrongful dismissal, Google spends a lot of time in court. While it is true
that Google makes a large target, it also is true … that it is operating in a field littered with
uncertainties begging to be resolved in the courts of law. Some of the lawsuits address key
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For example, in two recent cases, the Ninth Circuit considered the
extent to which two different online service providers – the Google search
engine in one case, and the Visa online payments system in the other –
could be liable for copyright infringement.85 The plaintiff in both cases was
Perfect 10, a company that made its money from selling photos of nude
models online.86 In the litigation against Google, Perfect 10 claimed
copyright infringement in respect of unauthorized reproductions and
displays of its copyrighted photographs that showed up in search results.87
Perfect 10 claimed both direct and indirect infringement, arguing that
Google should be held responsible for its own reproductions and displays of
the copyrighted photographs in its search engine results.88 It should also be
held secondarily liable for the infringements of the people who had actually
made the illegal copies in the first place where the copies showed up in
search results.89 In the litigation against Visa, Perfect 10 claimed only
secondary copyright infringement with respect to Visa enabling payments to
companies that sold unauthorized reproductions of Perfect 10’s protected
photographs.90
With respect to the secondary liability claims, the court ultimately held
issues that could define both Google and the Internet of the future.”)
85
Perfect 10 v Google, 508 F. 3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10 v Visa, 494 F. 3d
th
788 (9 Cir. 2007).
86
Perfect 10 v Google, 508 F. 3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Perfect 10 markets and
sells copyrighted images of nude models. Among other enterprises, it operates a
subscription website on the Internet. Subscribers pay a monthly fee to view Perfect 10
images in a ‘members' area’ of the site.”)
87
Id., at 1159 (“Perfect 10 claims that Google’s search engine program directly
infringes two exclusive rights granted to copyright holders: its display rights and its
distribution rights”).
88
Id., at 1163 (noting that plaintiff had succeeded in establishing a prima facie case
that Google had infringed its copyrights by reproducing copyrighted photographs as
thumbnail images); but see 1168 (court ultimately held that Google’s reproductions of the
images as thumbnails in its search engine results page was a fair use and therefore noninringing).
89
Id., at 1170 (describing the need to evaluate: “Perfect 10's arguments that Google is
secondarily liable in light of the direct infringement that is undisputed by the parties: thirdparty websites' reproducing, displaying, and distributing unauthorized copies of Perfect
10's images on the Internet”).
90
Perfect 10 v Visa, 494 F. 3d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Perfect 10, Inc. (Perfect 10)
sued Visa International Service Association, MasterCard International Inc., and several
affiliated banks and data processing services (collectively, the Defendants), alleging
secondary liability under federal copyright … law …. It sued because Defendants continue
to process credit card payments to websites that infringe Perfect 10's intellectual property
rights after being notified by Perfect 10 of infringement by those websites.”)
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that Google could potentially be contributorily liable for the copyright
infringements, but that there were factual matters to be reconsidered on
remand.91 However, with respect to Visa, the court held no secondary
liability on the basis that Visa’s activities were too far removed from the
primary infringements to be regarded as contributing to those
infringements.92 In distinguishing the Google case, the court noted in Visa
that: “The salient distinction is that Google’s search engine itself assists in
the distribution of infringing content to Internet users, while [Visa’s]
payments systems do not.”93 The majority in Visa admitted that Visa assists
in making the primary infringements profitable, but they distinguished the
profitability of the infringement from the distribution and availability of
infringing images online.94
The Visa case included a strong dissent from Judge Kozinski who
argued that the payments system provides more than a mere economic
incentive to infringe, but actually provides “an essential step in the
infringement process”.95 In Judge Kozinski’s view, without the payments
systems, infringement would be almost impossible.96 Clearly, there is room
91

Perfect 10 v Google, 508 F. 3d 1146, 1172-1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Google could be
held contributorily liable if it had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were
available using its search engine, could take simple measures to prevent further damage to
Perfect 10’s copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps. The district court did not
resolve the factual disputes over the adequacy of Perfect 10’s notices to Google and
Google’s responses to those notices. Moreover, there are factual disputes over whether
there are reasonable and feasible means for Google to refrain from providing access to
infringing images. Therefore, we must remand this claim to the district court for further
consideration whether Perfect 10 would likely succeed in establishing that Google was
contributorily liable …”)
92
Perfect 10 v Visa, 494 F. 3d 788, 796 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The credit card companies
cannot be said to materially contribute to the infringement in this case because they have
no direct connection to that infringement. Here, the infringement rests on the reproduction,
alteration, display and distribution of Perfect 10's images over the Internet. Perfect 10 has
not alleged that any infringing material passes over Defendants' payment networks or
through their payment processing systems, or that Defendants' systems are used to alter or
display the infringing images. … While Perfect 10 has alleged that Defendants make it
easier for websites to profit from this infringing activity, the issue here is reproduction,
alteration, display and distribution, which can occur without payment.”)
93
Id., at 797.
94
Id. (“[Visa] do[es], as alleged, make infringement more profitable, and people are
generally more inclined to engage in an activity when it is financially profitable. However,
there is an additional step in the causal chain: Google may materially contribute to
infringement by making it fast and easy for third parties to locate and distribute infringing
material, whereas [Visa] make[s] it easier for infringement to be profitable, which tends to
increase financial incentives to infringe, which in turn tends to increase infringement.”)
95
Id., at 812.
96
Id.(“My colleagues recognize, as they must, that helping consumers locate
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for disagreement as to where to draw the secondary liability line when it
comes to Internet gatekeepers. While both the cases involving Perfect 10
were about copyright law, and did not impact other areas of law, the
position of search engines and other online intermediaries is an unenviable
one in many contexts.
While providing accessible and innovative services to enable
individuals to interact more efficiently and effectively online, these service
providers are subject to the possibility of secondary liability claims for
activities about which they have little actual knowledge: including
copyright, defamation, trademark infringement, bullying, harassment
liability etc. Courts are likely to be faced with questions about what an
intermediary could or should have known about the activities of a primary
infringer in a number of these different contexts. These questions are
therefore not unique to copyright law.
As intermediaries’ business operations continue to scale up, they may be
less and less sure of what all their users are doing. In remanding the Google
case back to the lower court, the Ninth Circuit was mindful that it had
insufficient information about the realities of Google’s position to make a
meaningful determination on contributory liability. All it held was that
liability was possible on this basis, but it wanted the lower court to look
more closely at the position Google was actually in, and whether Google
realistically had the capabilities to detect and prevent copyright
infringement.97
Courts will continue to face questions of the secondary liability of
online intermediaries in copyright and other areas of law. A broader
cyberlaw-based perspective on these questions may ultimately be useful in
creating laws that give more meaningful and predictable guidance to those
providing online gateway services. Cyberlaw is the field in which this can
be achieved. In recent years, scholars have made some headway in
infringing content can constitute contributory infringement, but they consign the means of
payment to secondary status…. But why is locating infringing images more central to
infringement than paying for them? If infringing images can’t be found, there can be no
infringement; but if infringing images can’t be paid for, there can be no infringement
either…”)
97
Perfect 10 v Google, 508 F. 3d 1146, 1172-1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (“there are factual
disputes over whether there are reasonable and feasible means for Google to refrain from
providing access to infringing images. Therefore, we must remand this claim to the district
court for further consideration whether Perfect 10 would likely succeed in establishing that
Google was contributorily liable for in-line linking to full-size infringing images under the
test enunciated today.”)
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examining relevant legal principles not from the point of view of specific
legal field, but from the point of view of a particular Internet intermediary’s
perspective. This has occurred most prominently with respect to search
engines. 98 Accepting a broader field of cyberlaw might prevent these
debates from becoming piecemeal and degenerating into digital laws of the
horse such as “the law of the search engine”, “the law of the online social
network,” or “the law of virtual worlds”.
D. Responsibilities to Unmask Online Wrongdoers
Internet intermediaries are often in the position of being the only entity
capable of identifying or locating an online wrongdoer even in
circumstances where the intermediary itself is not complicit in committing
the harm. Much online communication is anonymous or pseudonymous.99
Thus, victims of online wrongs cannot identify the person or persons
engaging in harmful communications. Again, the power inherent in
knowing people’s true identities must come with responsibilities not to let
those people abuse their anonymity.
However, again, the law must strike a delicate balance between ensuring
that intermediaries assist in unmasking wrongdoers while at the same time
avoiding a chilling effect on intermediaries’ business models.
If
intermediaries are too often and too easily required to identify customers
who wish to remain anonymous, this will likely result in a chilling of online
activity. Internet users may be loathe to communicate online for fear of
being unmasked.100 Intermediaries may also falter if they cannot protect
their customers’ privacy.101 The requirement that intermediaries stand
98

Viva Moffat, Regulating Search, 22 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY
475 (2009); Greg Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOKLYN L REV 1327 (2008); Oren
Bracha and Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness and
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L REV 1129 (2008); James Grimmelman,
The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L REV 1 (2007); Urs Gasser, Regulating
Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 8 YALE J L & TECH 201 (2006); Eric
Goldman, Search Engine Bias and The Rise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE J L&
TECH 188 (2006).
99
Jacqueline Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, ___ BERKELEY TECH. L.J. ___
(forthcoming, 2011) (“The anonymity provided by the Internet may increase the volume of
abusive conduct because it may encourage individuals who would not engage in such
conduct offline to do so in the anonymous virtual forum provided by the Internet.”)
100
Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to
the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L. J. 1639, 1641 (1995) (noting the trend
for Internet users to desire to speak without censorship and to take advantage of the
Internet’s relative anonymity in doing so)
101
Id., at 1671 (“The Networld has an abundance of opportunities for full and
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ready to unmask their customers also imposes costs on intermediaries
related to obtaining and maintaining sufficiently detailed records to identify
customers when necessary.
To date, courts have developed rules to determine the circumstances
under which an Internet intermediary may be ordered to divulge the identity
of an alleged defendant102 or a witness to an online wrong.103 In these
cases, judges have had to draw lines that most appropriately balance the
interests of an intermediary in protecting its members’ anonymity against
the interests of a complainant. Judges have faced these challenges in the
context of cases involving copyright infringement,104 defamation,105
trademark infringement,106 and complaints about reputational harm.107
A broader look at these questions through the lens of Internet
intermediary liability more generally would enable more cohesive and
systematic rules to develop over time. The development of clearer rules
about the responsibility of intermediaries to maintain and divulge
identifying records about customers would assist in making business more
predictable for intermediaries and their customers. This predictability may
also be useful to victims of online wrongs as they would gain a better ex
ante sense of the likelihood of unmasking a potential defendant or witness
in a given situation.
The role of the Internet intermediary is a foundational part of the
cyberlaw field. Intermediaries are necessary for all online transactions. No
one can interact online without using at least one intermediary.
uninhibited speech. The difficulty has become one of offended parties seeking to inhibit the
speech of the offending posters of messages. As the offended turn to their lawyers to
redress their grievances, this uninhibited cauldron of opinion becomes threatened. Should
strict liability for all electronic transmission become the accepted norm, service providers
might scramble to hide behind contracts, waivers, monitoring of all content, and censorship
of messages before posting …. Liability insurance would be prohibitively expensive, the
burden of monitoring all messages before posting them too demanding, and the possibility
of facing protracted litigation too onerous.”)
102
Columbia Ins. Co. v SeesCandy.Com, 18 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999); In re
Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, 52 Va. Cir. 26 (2000); Doe I and Doe II v
Individuals, Whose True Names Are Unknown, Civil Action No. 3:07 CV 909 (CFD), 2008
WL 2428206 (D. Conn. June 13, 2008).
103
Doe v 2TheMart.Com., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wa. 2001).
104
In re Verizon Internet Services., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003).
105
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, 52 Va. Cir. 26 (2000).
106
Columbia Ins. Co. v SeesCandy.Com, 18 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
107
Doe I and Doe II v Individuals, Whose True Names Are Unknown, Civil Action No.
3:07 CV 909 (CFD), 2008 WL 2428206 (D. Conn. June 13, 2008).
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Intermediaries are the gatekeepers to all we do online. They hold great
power in the sense of enabling access to online communications, setting the
parameters of online conduct through their software coding, and
maintaining records of the identities of online actors. Along with this
power come certain responsibilities.
However, imposing legal
responsibilities on intermediaries will generally come at a cost. The more
duties legally imposed on intermediaries, the more likely the result will be a
chilling of online innovation.
It is within the cyberlaw field that commentators and lawmakers will
need to develop appropriate balances to impose obligations on
intermediaries to an extent that will curtail online harm while preserving the
vitality of online interaction. In order to develop this balance, it will be
necessary to identify the scope of appropriate online behaviors more
generally. Thus, another important aspect of the cyberlaw field must be an
identification and explication of appropriate online norms of behavior.
III. CYBERNORMS
Cyberspace norms, their identification, and enforcement, often raise
significantly different interests and dynamics than real space norms of
behavior. Real space norms involve physical interactions between people
and property while cyberspace norms involve communications over often
great distances. In real space, people are confronted with other physical
beings. Physical world interactions involve facial expressions, tone of
voice, and physical appearance. It is often much more difficult to say to
someone’s face something that you would say behind her back, or that you
would say anonymously or pseudonymously online.108
Real space laws have developed to reinforce – and simply to enforce –
real space norms. Norms about protecting a zone of safety around a person,
for example, are enforced through stalking and harassment laws.109 The
problem for cyberlaw is that many of the real world laws that protect
individuals from harm do not apply meaningfully in cyberspace. The real
space laws largely hinge on notions of physical space, personal safety and
damage to people and property which do not always translate well to
cyberspace.110
108

See supra note 38.
Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, supra note 99, at ___ (citing examples of
these laws).
110
Sánchez Abril, supra note 8, at 4 (“In the absence of clear and relevant guidance,
courts have resorted to intellectual shortcuts in their use of concepts of space, subject
109
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The tort of conversion, for example, is fairly well circumscribed in
physical space.111 It is obvious in spatial terms whether or not someone has
interfered with another person’s physical property. But how might that play
out in cyberspace? Can you meaningfully “convert” or “steal” another
person’s virtual or digital property? Most online property can exist in
multiple places at the same time so taking (or copying) my digital property
does not deprive me of my own access to it. This differs from the physical
world where property is rivalrous: that is, it can only exist in one place at a
time.112 Thus, your taking of my property deprives me of the property.
However, copying someone’s digital widget creates a second widget and
does not deprive the owner of the original widget or its use.113 The taking
may impact the value of the original widget, but not its very existence in the
hands of the original owner. Few online assets are truly rivalrous in the
same sense that physical property is rivalrous.
Even rivalrous online property can raise different legal issues from
those arising in physical space. One example of rivalrous digital property is
an Internet domain name.114 A domain name can only be registered to one
matter, secrecy, and seclusion as necessary benchmarks for privacy protection. What were
once mere indicators of privacy have become, in some instances, the extent of judicial
inquiry. Problematically, these entrenched constructs are all related in one form or another
to a pervasive consciousness of physical space, a concept that is no longer relevant in
analyzing many modern online privacy harms.”)
111
Restatement 2d on Torts, § 222A(1) (“Conversion is an intentional exercise of
dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to
control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the
chattel.”)
112
Lawrence Solum, Questioning Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 822
(“’Rivalrousness’ is a property of the consumption of a good. Consumption of a good is
rivalrous if consumption by one individual X diminished the opportunity of other
individuals, Y, Z, etc., to consume the good. Some goods are rivalrous because they are
‘used up.’ If I drink a glass of Heitz Martha's Vineyard, then you cannot drink that same
glass of wine. If I set off a firecracker, you cannot set off the same firecracker. Other goods
are rivalrous because of crowding effects. If I am using the free Internet terminal at the
student lounge, then you cannot use the same time slice of the terminal - because only one
person can sit in front of the screen at the same time.”)
113
The only effective way to actually deprive someone of her digital property is to
destroy that property: for example, by deleting data from a protected server. The law has
traditionally dealt with this kind of conduct by focusing on the hardware aspects of a
digital system, rather than the content per se. See, for example, the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act: 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (dealing with hacking into computer systems and destroying
data).
114
JACQUELINE LIPTON, INTERNET DOMAIN NAMES, TRADEMARKS AND FREE SPEECH,
4 (2010) (“Domain names comprise a unique form of online asset. They are the closest
Internet analogy to real property. This is because, unlike other forms of digital property,
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person at a time.115 Even so, it is not clear that real world notions of
property interference apply meaningfully to domain names. While at least
one court has held that a domain name is property capable of conversion,116
the way in which the domain name was wrongfully appropriated was very
different to an unauthorized taking of physical property. To convert a
domain name, one must send a fraudulent request to the domain name
registering authority to transfer the name.117 It is not possible to simply
“take” the name as one might take a car, a chair, or an apple. One must
rely on an intermediary – in this case, a domain name registry – to effect the
conversion. This again underlines the importance of intermediaries in the
cyberworld.
Of course, real world laws have been developed to deal with
information-based wrongs as well as physical wrongs. In other words, we
already have laws that do not require physical property to exist for a wrong
to have been committed. Defamation and privacy laws, for example, deal
with harms caused by dissemination of damaging information about an
individual. These torts, and their associated underlying behavioral norms,
may be easier to apply online than property-based torts because they do not
require physical harm to a person or property. Nevertheless, even these
informational torts raise new challenges online.
Consider defamation law, for example. While defamation law in the
physical world has typically dealt with professional media outlets
publishing harmful information about individuals, online defamation can be
quite different. As more individuals are publishing their own thoughts
online, and defaming others in the process, the professional journalist is
effectively replaced – or at least joined in the role of social commentator by the amateur commentator.118 With Web 2.0 technologies,119 individuals
they are rivalrous. This means that one domain name can only be held by one person or
entity at a time.”)
115
Id.
116
Kremen v Cohen, 337 F. 3d 1024 (2003).
117
Jacqueline Lipton, Bad Faith in Cyberspace: Grounding Domain Name Theory in
Trademark, Property and Restitution, 23 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY
447, 474 (2010) (“a transfer of a domain name is, in reality, a de-registration from the
original registrant and re-registration to the new registrant, it is now treated routinely as a
seamless transfer, as if the name was being handed directly from the original registrant to
the new registrant.”)
118
ANDREW KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR: HOW BLOGS, MYSPACE, YOUTUBE,
AND THE REST OF TODAY’S USER-GENERATED MEDIA ARE DESTROYING OUR ECONOMY,
OUR CULTURE, AND OUR VALUES (2007) (expressing concerns about the move from
professional media to communal digital media); Larry Ribstein, From Bricks to Pajamas:
The Law and Economics of Amateur Journalism, 48 WM AND MARY L. REV. 185 (2006)
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easily share their thoughts about others on Twitter, blogs, and online social
networks.
Naturally, when much of the world’s social commentary is disseminated
in this way, very different behavioral norms develop than when
dissemination of information is predominantly in the hands of professional
media conglomerates.
Individual commentators are not bound by
professional codes of ethics.120 Individuals may hide behind a shield of
anonymity more easily than professional journalists.121 Further, individuals
may simply not be as aware of the laws of defamation and privacy than
professional media outlets. This is not to say that individual commentary
should be prohibited or legally sanctioned more aggressively than
professional commentary.
Amateur or individual speech provides
tremendous social benefits.122
However, the norms of Web 2.0
informational transactions are significantly different from those that
developed in the physical world. The existing defamation and privacy laws
were simply not developed with these kinds of behavioral norms in mind.
Outside of the basic differences between online and offline norms are
the practical difficulties of applying national defamation laws to online
conduct because of the jurisdictional reach of particular laws and courts.123
This is another reason why behavioral norms are increasingly important to
online transactions. If norms can be identified and enforced by online
communities, there is less need for victims of online wrongs to rely on law.
In other words, laws can serve a signposting function about appropriate
(examining the rise of amateur journalism through blogging).
119
LOWE, supra note 39, at 294 (defining “Web 2.0” as: “A term used to describe an
evolving generation of a participatory Web. Web 2.0 describes the proliferation of
interconnectivity and social interaction on the World Wide Web.”)
120
Ribstein, supra note 118, at 214 (noting that amateur journalists are typically not
bound by codes of ethics and noting some of the advantages inherent of being free from
such perceived constraints); KEEN, supra note 118, at 82 (noting lack of codes of ethics in
amateur online journalism).
121
KEEN, supra note 118, at 77 (“In traditional news media, there is no such thing as
anonymity. Articles and op-eds run with bylines, holding reporters and contributors
responsible for the content they create. This not only holds them to ethical standards, but
also provides a level of assurance for the public; the writer is accountable for his or her
reporting or opinions …. But in the anonymous world of the blogosphere there are no such
assurances, creating a crisis of trust and confidence.”)
122
Ribstein, supra note 118, at 214 (“Even if it were feasible to develop norms for
amateur journalists, it may not be desirable. An important social benefit of amateur
journalists is that they are not subject to professional norms and constraints. In devising
extralegal constraints, as with legal regulation, one must control the costs of amateur
journalism in a way that does not sacrifice its benefits.”)
123
See Part IV, infra.
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behavior124 in contexts where intermediaries and online communities are
already articulating and enforcing appropriate norms of behavior amongst
themselves.125
Defamation is not the only area in which online norms may differ from
the real space counterparts upon which existing laws were originally based.
Other information-based torts raise challenges when applied online.
Privacy laws, for example, rely to a significant extent on physical space
metaphors. The notion of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” which
arises in both criminal and tort-based privacy law is powerfully tied to
notions of physical space.126 One might be presumed to have a reasonable
expectation of privacy behind a locked door but not in a public mall.
However, in cyberspace, it is much more difficult to delineate the
boundaries of a reasonable expectation of privacy, particularly as so much
digital media blurs the lines between our public and our private selves.127
Sexting is an obvious example of conduct that may commence as a private
and consensual act but may quickly escalate into the public domain
depending on who ultimately gains possession of the images.128 If a
teenager engages in consensual sexual acts with a partner and agrees to a
124

NEIL NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX, 104-105 (2008) (“[L]aw often serves an
expressive or symbolic function above and beyond regulating or providing incentives for
conduct. Antidiscrimination law, for example, may have symbolic importance beyond
whatever discriminatory conduct it actually proscribes. In enacting and applying such law,
Congress and the courts effectively express our society’s official condemnation of
discrimination based on race and various other classifications.”)
125
From the early days of the Internet, online communities have self-policed and
enforced acceptable norms of behavior amongst themselves. See, for example, SHERRY
TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN: IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET, 251 (1995)
(describing the “toading” of a virtual rapist in an early online environment, toading being
the erasure of his character for his unacceptable behavior).
126
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 74 (noting the difficulties
inherent in determining reasonable expectations of privacy as privacy is effectively eroded
through developing technologies such as data collection and digital cameras).
127
BARNES, supra note 38, at 35-36 (noting how moves towards reality television and
personal blogging blur the lines between public and private selves and make private
individuals into instant celebrities).
128
Elizabeth Eraker, Stemming Sexting: Sensible Legal Approaches to Teenagers'
Exchange of Self-Produced Pornography, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 555, 557 (2010)
(“Although sexting has been described as the modern equivalent of ‘streaking,’ new
technologies dramatically enhance the consequences of this behavior. Camera-equipped
phones allow permanent recording of images and instant dissemination to large numbers of
recipients, transforming fleeting youthful indiscretions into lasting mistakes …. the term
‘sexting’ refers to the self-production and distribution by cell phone of sexually explicit
images in the course of consensual, voluntary activity by teenagers”).
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video or picture memorializing the event, does that mean there should be no
expectation of privacy from that point forward?
Certainly, one could argue that all modern teens with cellphone-cameras
know that once an image is captured on the phone, it can be globally
disseminated over the Internet at the push of a button. On this basis, it may
be reasonable to differentiate this conduct from an old-fashioned physical
photograph of a consensual sexual act. Even though the physical image
may be shared with others, it cannot be as easily, quickly, cheaply, and
globally disseminated at the push of a button. The hard copy photograph
also lacks the permanence of an Internet distribution of a digital image.
Once a hard copy photograph is destroyed, no one can view it anymore.
However, once a digital image is disseminated online, there is no way to
permanently eradicate it, even if the original image is deleted from where it
was initially posted.129
Of course arguing about the importance of online norms runs the risk of
suggesting that laws are irrelevant in cyberspace. Additionally, to the
extent that one argues in favor of norm enforcement within a community,
one potentially circles back to debates about whether cyberspace can – or
should - be meaningfully regulated by national governments,130 and whether
law is the most appropriate form of regulation in cyberspace.131
Emphasizing the importance of norms online does not necessarily mean that
laws and national governments are irrelevant. Rather, it is important to
consider norms as the basis of legal rules, while acknowledging that norms
can be enforced outside of the law.
Even the earliest Internet communities developed ways to punish those
who disregarded behavioral norms.132 Norms of more recent online
communities are often enforced through private online dispute resolution
procedures that support express rules of the forum. Wikipedia and Second
Life, for example, have each developed express rules of online behavior that
are enforced by private mechanisms.133 Legal rules based on cybernorms
can also serve an important expressive function in helping us to identify
129

Jacqueline Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”: Developing a Privacy Paradigm for
Digital Video, 95 IOWA L. REV. 919, 977 (2010) (describing the impossibility of removing
all iterations of a given image from the Internet).
130
See supra note 27.
131
See Lessig, What the Law of the Horse Might Teach, supra note 17.
132
See TURKLE, supra note 125.
133
Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, supra note 99, at Part III.D.4 (describing
approaches to industry self-regulation online).
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appropriate dimensions of online behavior in particular contexts.134
The cyberlaw field provides a necessary framework within which to
situate debates about the identification of online norms in a variety of fields,
their divergence from physical world norms, and their relationship to legal
rules. It provides commentators and lawmakers with a conceptual space
within which to consider legal developments that reflect and reinforce
appropriate norms of online behavior. Of course, one of the reasons that
investigating norms is so important in cyberspace is that laws may have
limited jurisdictional reach online. It is to those jurisdictional challenges
that we now turn our attention.
IV. JURISDICTION
A. Cyberspace Conflicts: Jurisdiction and Enforcement
When global communications were easily, quickly, and cheaply enabled
in the 1990s by the widespread public take-up of the Internet, it seemed
obvious that the major new legal issues would be jurisdictional. The
Internet opened up seemingly endless possibilities for litigating against
foreign defendants, raising choice of law and choice of forum questions as
well as foreign enforcement challenges.135 Even if a court in the plaintiff’s
jurisdiction agreed to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant and an
order was obtained in favor of the plaintiff, it would not always be clear that
the order could be enforced in the foreign jurisdiction. Particularly
problematic were cases where the defendant held no assets in the plaintiff’s
jurisdiction that might be attached as part of a judgment order. The ongoing
litigation between Yahoo! and La Ligue contre le Racisme et
l’Antisemitisme in France is a good example highlighting uncertainties
about how, or indeed if, a court order from the plaintiff’s country might be
enforced in the defendant’s country.136
In the Yahoo! litigation, a French plaintiff successfully obtained a
French court order to have Yahoo! enjoined from selling Nazi memorabilia
in France.137 Subsequently, Yahoo! took up the matter in California and
attempted to obtain a declaration from the Californian courts that the French
134

NETANEL, supra note 124.
See, for example, discussion in Michael Gilden, Jurisdiction and the Internet: The
“Real World” Meets Cyberspace, 7 ILSA J INT'L & COMP L 149 (2000).
136
Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme v Yahoo!, Superior Court of Paris
(Nov. 20, 2000).
137
Id.
135
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order would not be enforced against Yahoo!’s assets in California.138 To
date, the Californian courts have refrained from giving a definitive answer
to this question.139 The Californian courts have been split on issues whether
the case is ripe for a decision, and as to whether the Californian courts can
exercise personal jurisdiction over the French organization.140 The United
States Supreme Court has denied certiorari,141 so ultimately any decision
made will be in a lower court in California.
Jurisdictional questions are not necessarily new to the Internet.
However, the Internet raises new challenges for conflicts of law by its very
nature. For one thing, when addressing jurisdictional issues in cyberspace,
courts have often complicated their analyses by focusing on the hardware
aspects of the Internet. For example, at a loss for guidance on how to
ascertain whether a defendant could be said to have purposefully availed
herself of the plaintiff’s forum,142 early courts tended to consider the
location of physical computer servers.143 This approach led to random and
unpredictable results because of the nature of the Internet. The whole point
of the network is that electrons flow relatively randomly through cables
(and now wirelessly) to avoid a single point of failure bringing down the
entire network.144 Thus, premising jurisdictional queries on electron flows
is unlikely to lead to principled and predictable legal rules.
138

Yahoo! v La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (2006).
Id., at 1224 (“An eight-judge majority of the en banc panel holds… that the district
court properly exercised specific personal jurisdiction over defendants LICRA and UEJF
…. A three-judge plurality of the panel concludes … that the suit is unripe for decision …..
When the votes of the three judges who conclude that the suit is unripe are combined with
the votes of the three dissenting judges who conclude that there is no personal jurisdiction
over LICRA and UEJF, there are six votes to dismiss Yahoo!'s suit.”)
140
Id.
141
La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme v. Yahoo!., 547 U.S. 1163 (2006)
(denying cert.).
142
Purposeful availment is a prong of a specific personal jurisdiction inquiry and
focuses on the defendant’s activities within the plaintiff’s forum. See, for example,
discussion of the concept in Yahoo! v La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433
F.3d 1199, 1205-1207 (2006).
143
See, for example, Bochan v La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Va. 1999)
(personal jurisdiction hinged on fortuitous location of servers accessed by defendants).
144
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom of Speech: A First
Amendment Catch-22, 75 TUL. L. REV. 87, n 38 (2000) (“The TCP/IP protocols break
down information transmitted on to the Internet into packets and reassemble it at its
destination …. This allows the Internet to operate as a packet-switched network where the
various data packets may travel different routes to reach the same destination ….. This
design allows information to be transmitted through the Internet at faster speeds than
circuit-switched networks, where, once a connection is made, that part of the network is
dedicated only to that connection.”)
139
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One reason for the tendency to focus on the physical aspects of the
network derived from difficulties inherent in the other obvious option – to
consider where the defendant actually engaged in the harmful conduct.
When the defendant’s conduct is effectively an online communication, and
that communication is accessible globally, the purposeful availment inquiry
is not very meaningful in practice. If a defendant posts, say, a defamatory
comment about a plaintiff on a blog that is accessible globally, is it fair to
say that the defendant has purposely availed herself of the jurisdiction of the
entire world?145
Another alternative is to create a blanket rule that the appropriate
jurisdiction for litigation is the place where the plaintiff suffers harm.
Several courts have taken this approach in the past,146 and it certainly seems
logical at least from the plaintiff’s point of view. One could easily argue
that plaintiffs in, say, defamation suits should not have to go to foreign
courts to sue defendants who may be taking advantage of their geographical
distance, or from more lenient defamation laws in a particular jurisdiction.
However, erring on the side of the plaintiff’s jurisdiction may not be
particularly fair to the defendant.147 If a defendant is potentially to be held
liable for any comments made online under the laws of any jurisdiction in
which a plaintiff resides or does business, it may be impossible for that
defendant to protect itself from unexpected foreign litigation. The fact that
defendants would face such significant risks of litigation in foreign
jurisdictions under a rule that favored the plaintiff’s jurisdiction may
ultimately chill much online speech. Defamation defendants have argued
against such a rule in past litigation.148 These concerns come into sharp
145

Dow Jones v Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56 (10 Dec. 2002), at para. 54 (noting
defamation defendant’s concern about being haled into court in any jurisdiction in which
its online publications were accessed).
146
Id., at para. 44 (“ordinarily, defamation is to be located at the place where the
damage to reputation occurs. Ordinarily that will be where the material which is alleged to
be defamatory is available in comprehensible form assuming, of course, that the person
defamed has in that place a reputation which is thereby damaged.”); Robertson, supra note
9; Calder v Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (granting jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant
with respect to a defamation action that harmed the plaintiff – actress Shirley Jones – in
California).
147
Robertson, supra note 9, at ___ (arguing that in the digital age, personal jurisdiction
queries should be presumptively resolved in favor of the defendant).
148
Gutnick v Dow Jones, VSC 305, para. 56 (Aug. 28, 2001) (aff’d, Dow Jones v
Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56 (10 Dec. 2002)) (noting American publishers significant concerns
at being haled into court in Australia for an article it published allegedly defaming an
Australian resident).
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relief in situations where defendants are increasingly amateur journalists
and social commentators who would not have the wherewithal to defend a
proceeding in a foreign jurisdiction.149
While there are a number of counter-arguments to concerns about
unfairness to defendants,150 the point of this discussion is not to identify the
correct rule on personal jurisdiction in cyberspace. Rather, it is to
demonstrate that cyberspace raises distinct legal challenges that merit its
treatment as a discrete legal field with its own set of unifying principles.
One of those principles has to be the investigation of what factors
differentiate cyberspace from physical space in the context of determining
how to approach jurisdictional challenges.
Unlike physical world publications, information disseminated over the
Internet can generally be received anywhere in the world, subject only to
technological limitations such as firewalls and encryption. Thus the default
position in Internet publication is effectively opposite to that in the physical
world. Online information defaults to being published to everyone globally
whereas in the physical world, information is only published to those to
whom the publisher has specifically directed it. Thus, the risk of being
haled into court in an unexpected foreign jurisdiction is significantly higher
for a defendant in an Internet case than in a physical world case.
B. Jurisdiction Deterring Substantive Rights
The Internet may raise additional challenges related to basic
jurisdictional questions. In Internet-based litigation, there is a high risk that
the initial focus of the litigation will be on jurisdictional issues, rather than
on the substance of the plaintiff’s complaint. Because of the greater number
of jurisdictional issues in cyberlaw as compared with physical world cases,
a greater proportion of cyberspace law cases might be disposed of at the
149

Robertson, supra note 9, at ___ (noting that many publishers online are now
private individuals and it would be unfair to presume their amenability to foreign
jurisdiction).
150
Dow Jones v Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56, para. 53 (10 Dec. 2002) (arguing that
damages award will only be made in a defamation case where the plaintiff realistically has
a reputation to harm in the place where publication is received); para. 56 (noting that
plaintiffs are unlikely to sue in a jurisdiction outside the defendant’s forum unless a
judgment in that forum would be of real value to the plaintiff and the answer to that
question may depend on whether, and to what extent, the defendant holds assets in the
plaintiff’s forum); para 56 (noting that in “all except the most unusual of cases, identifying
the person about whom material is to be published will readily identify the defamation law
to which that person may resort”).
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jurisdictional stage without ever getting to a determination of the parties’
substantive rights and obligations. The cyberlaw field can provide a forum
within which jurisdictional rules may be streamlined and harmonized. Such
a result would then minimize the time and expense necessary on
jurisdictional questions in particular cases, and would allow judges to focus
more on exploring and developing the substantive rights and obligations of
parties in cyberspace disputes.
A recent example of a case in which jurisdictional considerations
arguably detracted from an investigation of the plaintiff’s substantive rights
is Chang v Virgin Mobile.151 In this case, Chang brought inter alia a
privacy claim against Virgin Mobile for unauthorized use of a photograph
of her in an advertising campaign.152 Chang resided in Texas while the
advertising campaign took place in Australia. Virgin Mobile had found the
picture of Chang online and copied it from a public photo-sharing website.
Virgin Mobile had only utilized the photograph within Australia on bus
shelter ad shells.153 It had never used the advertisement in the United
States, nor had it posted the ad to the Internet.154 Because the defendant had
never directed any of its conduct towards the state of Texas, the American
court held that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.155
This decision effectively left Chang without a substantive remedy. For
one thing, she was an individual and a teenager without the wherewithal to
sue the defendants in Australia. Perhaps more significantly, Australia does
not have the same privacy torts available to plaintiffs as the United States.
In the United States, Chang could have claimed misappropriation of her
personal image under the misappropriation limb of privacy tort law.156 The
151

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3051 (2009).
Id., at 1 (Plaintiffs Susan Chang as next friend of Alison Chang, a minor … sued
defendant Virgin Mobile Pty Ltd., an Australian-based company, in Texas state court on
claims for invasion of privacy, libel, breach of contract, and copyright infringement based
on Virgin Australia's use of an image of Alison … in its ‘Are You With Us or What’
advertising campaign ….).
153
Id., at 4 (“The advertisement was placed on bus shelter ad shells in major
metropolitan areas in Australia. Virgin Australia never distributed the advertisement
incorporating Alison’s image in the United States, including Texas, and it never posted the
photograph on its website or on any other website.”)
154
Id.
155
Id., at 26 (“Because none of the … contacts on which plaintiffs rely establishes
sufficient minimum contacts between Virgin Australia and the state of Texas, the court
cannot constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over Virgin Australia.”)
156
Restatement 2d of Torts, § 652C (One who appropriates to his own use or benefit
the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
152
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misappropriation tort provides a remedy to a plaintiff where a defendant has
made an unauthorized commercial use of her name or likeness.157 There is
no similar tort in Australia, even if Chang had had the wherewithal to
litigate there.
Given that the issue in the Chang case involved unauthorized use of a
photograph, one might think that the more obvious cause of action would be
a copyright claim. After all, copyright law is much more harmonized
globally than privacy law.158 Australia protects copyrighted photographs to
a similar extent as the United States.159 The problem for Chang was that
she was not the photographer, but rather than image subject. In most cases,
the person who takes a photograph is the copyright holder with respect to
that photograph.160 The image subject is therefore hardly ever the copyright
holder, unless she has contracted for the assignment of copyright, or the
photograph is a work for hire.161
There may in fact be nothing wrong with the ultimate holding in Chang.
If Texas is not the correct forum for litigation, then Chang is out of luck.
Too readily allowing plaintiffs to sue in their home jurisdictions in Internet
cases, as noted above, may impose insurmountable burdens on defendants
and hence on online speech more generally.162 However, Chang is far from
the only Internet case that has been effectively resolved by a jurisdictional
inquiry either because the plaintiff could not afford to sue in the defendant’s
jurisdiction or because the plaintiff did not have an effective claim under the
defendant’s law.
privacy.”)
157
Id.
158
LEAFFER, supra note 83, at 570 (describing the major harmonization efforts relating
to copyright law at the international level).
159
Australian Copyright Council, Photographers & Copyright, INFORMATION
SHEET G011v14 (January 2006, on file with the author) (“Copyright protects a range of
materials, including photographs”); LEAFFER, supra note 83, at 116 (noting that copyright
protection for ‘pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’ in the United States includes
photographs under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5)).
160
Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the
Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385 (2004) (tracing the history of
photographic copyrights in the United States and the basis of the trend towards granting
photographers copyrights in their work).
161
17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “work made for hire” as: “(1) a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or
commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work … if the parties expressly
agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made
for hire .….”).
162
Robertson, supra note 9.
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Many Internet cases have historically been effectively resolved at the
jurisdiction determination stage, or have used the jurisdictional inquiry as a
testing ground for considering the merits of the case.163 Again this is not a
new phenomenon. Several pre-Internet cases were effectively resolved by a
jurisdictional finding adverse to the plaintiff.164 However, there are two
reasons why Internet cases may require closer analysis with respect to
jurisdiction. For one thing, the proportion of Internet cases raising
jurisdictional issues is likely to be higher than the proportion of non-Internet
cases. Thus, Internet law creates greater risks of jurisdictional inquiries
detracting from inquiries about developments of substantive rights. The
second problem is that the substantive issues raised in Internet cases are
likely to be significantly different from those raised in non-Internet cases.165
If Internet case law disproportionately tends towards jurisdictional analysis,
the development of substantive legal rights and duties online is likely to be
stunted in practice.
If the cyberlaw field can contribute anything to our understanding of the
law more generally, it should be able to contribute a more systematic and
principled approach to the development and application of jurisdictional
principles in Internet-related cases. The ability to more quickly, efficiently,
and predictably resolve jurisdictional problems would allow greater focus
on developing more meaningful substantive rules for online conduct. Of
course, jurisdictional issues both online and offline are often extremely
difficult to resolve. Nevertheless, the ability to focus specifically on
cyberspace-related jurisdictional problems within a more unified theoretical
framework is likely to assist in more principled and predictable legal
developments.
V. HARMS AND REMEDIES

163

Roberton, supra note 9, at [2] (“In effects-test cases, the merits are inextricably
intertwined with jurisdictional issues and therefore unconsciously influence the courts’
decisions on personal jurisdiction.”).
164
See, for example, ALS Scan v Digital Service Consultants, 293 F. 3d 707 (4th Cir.
2002) (holding that maintaining a passive website that can be accessed and used by
residents in the plaintiff’s forum state is insufficient to support personal jurisdiction over
the defendant); Cybersell v Cybersell, 130 F. 3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a passive
website accessible in Arizona was insufficient to support personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant); Toys R Us v Step Two, 318 F. 3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that the
mere existence of an interactive commercial website is insufficient to establish that a
defendant purposely availed itself of the plaintiff’s forum state).
165
See supra Part II; infra Part V.
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A. Recognizing Online Harms
Unlike the physical world where courts will usually award damages to
remedy economic harms or physical damage to a person or property,
cyberspace cases will typically revolve around reputational and emotional
harms. This is obvious if one thinks back to the nature of the Internet as a
global communications medium. Everything that happens online happens
through information exchange. There is no physical contact between people
online. Thus, damages will not be physical, but psychological, emotional,
or reputational.
Cyberlaw as a field needs to encompass an investigation of the kinds of
online harms caused by damaging communications and, as a corollary, the
appropriate remedies for those harms. For example, how does one
effectively quantify the harm caused by posting an embarrassing picture or
video of someone online which then goes viral and cannot be removed from
the Internet once it has been shared globally? Should the law even
recognize this as a harm capable of legal redress? People can be severely
emotionally scarred by damaging online postings.166 However, if there is
no physical injury resulting from, say, online bullying, mobbing or
harassment,167 the victim may have been seriously wronged in a moral
sense, but with no legal remedy.168
Professors Solove and Bartow have for some years engaged in a heated
debate about whether privacy, for example, has been given short shrift by
lawmakers in the digital age because there are “not enough dead bodies”.169
Solove has advocated a conception of privacy that attracts legal
sanctions.170 Bartow has suggested that perhaps the reason that legislators
166

DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON
THE INTERNET, 35-48 (2007) (giving multiple examples of people whose reputations and
livelihoods were seriously injured by online gossip) [hereinafter, THE FUTURE OF
REPUTATION].
167

Jacqueline Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, supra note 99, at ___
(describing examples of online bullying, mobbing and harassment).
168
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 166, at 123 (“Under our current
legal system, we have remedies for defamation and invasion of privacy, but … these
remedies are currently quite limited in their effectiveness, especially the law of privacy.
The current law is too limited and restricted to serve as a tenable threat in many
situations.”)
169
Ann Bartow, “Nothing to Hide” Indeed: Of “Debunking” and Willful Distortions,
Madisonian.Net, May 26, 2011 (available at http://madisonian.net/2011/05/26/ofdebunking-and-willful-distortions/, last viewed on August 3, 2011) (debate between
Professor Bartow and Professor Solove on a popular intellectual property blog).
170
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 166, at 123-124 (describing a
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and courts have not been prepared to redress some of the wrongs identified
by Solove is that the harms he has identified are not yet perceived as
sufficiently visceral.171
The point for cyberlaw studies is that many of the harms which that
seemed trivial and hardly worthy of remedial action in the physical world
may now merit legal redress. Whereas an embarrassing photograph or
comment about an individual shared in physical space will likely only have
a minor and temporary effect on that person, even a relatively innocuous
photograph that goes viral online may dog the image subject for the rest of
her life.172 Internet communications require a reconsideration of the nature
of harm that merits legal redress. Cyberlaw is the appropriate field within
which to engage in those debates.
B. Online Wrongs Resulting in Physical Harm
Of course, in some cases, online communications can result in actual
physical harm. Some of this harm can be devastating, as in the case where
an individual posted an ad on Craigslist that a young woman wanted to be
sexually attacked and giving her address.173 This resulted in the woman
being attacked by a person who responded to the ad.174 Some cases of
online bullying or harassment have also led to suicides of the subjects of the
harmful online commentary.175 The respective suicides of Megan Meier and
conception of legal remedies for online privacy invasions and other reputational damage).
171
Ann Bartow, A Feeling of Unease About Privacy Law, 11 PENNUMBRA (2006),
available at http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/11-2006/Bartow.pdf, last viewed on
August 3, 2011 (“To phrase it colloquially, in this author’s view, the Solove taxonomy of
privacy suffers from too much doctrine, and not enough dead bodies. It frames privacy
harms in dry, analytical terms that fail to sufficiently identify and animate the compelling
ways that privacy violations can negatively impact the lives of living, breathing human
beings beyond simply provoking feelings of unease.”)
172
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 166, at 4 (“As social-reputation
shaping practices such as gossip and shaming migrate to the Internet, they are being
transformed in significant ways. Information that was once scattered, forgettable, and
localized is becoming permanent and searchable.”); Jacqueline Lipton, “We, the
Paparazzi”, supra note 129, at 983 (“…even if current Internet users’ apparent
carelessness about personal information online is temporary, the effects of this carelessness
may be widespread, permanent, and devastating because of the global and increasingly
archival nature of today's online content. Coupled with the aggregation and
decontextualization problems …, the ‘blip’ of unfortunate behavior today may have serious
long-term consequences for many people.”)
173
Jacqueline Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, supra note 99, at ___ .
174
Id.
175
Id., at ___ (describing suicide of thirteen year old Megan Meier as a result of
online bullying).
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Roger Clementi are tragic cases in point.176
In cases where online communications cause real physical harm, it is
very difficult for law and policy makers to determine legal liability. Which
parties in the causal chain, if any, should ultimately be held responsible?
One may think that the most obvious place to start in attaching legal
liability is with the person who causes the actual physical damage.
However, this will not always be effective in practice. In the case of a
suicide, for example, there is no physical attacker. The victim kills herself
as a result of online comments.
Further, in the case of many physical assaults, the physical perpetrator
of the harm may have been misled and may not have intended to cause any
real damage. In the case of a fraudulent rape fantasy notice like the one
posted on Craigslist, for example, the perpetrator of the physical attack may
think the victim’s protests are all just part of the act. In strict liability torts
and crimes, the intention of the physical attacker may be irrelevant.
However, in cases where the state of mind of the defendant is relevant, this
may significantly diminish remedies available to the victim with respect to
the activities of the physical actor.
Other than the physical actor, might liability attach to anyone else? In
cyberspace-related cases, the question arises as to whether the online actors
who incited the physical harm should share any of the blame for the
resulting harm. The suicide of thirteen year old Megan Meier is an example
of a devastating result in the physical world of morally reprehensible online
conduct. One of Meier’s classmate’s mothers, Lori Drew, created a false
persona online – Josh Evans – to start a virtual relationship with Meier in
order to find out if Meier would say anything negative about Drew’s
daughter.177 Ultimately, Drew used the Evans persona to torture and
humiliate Meier, ultimately saying that the world would be a better place
without her.178
As a result of Drew’s hurtful words in the guise of Evans, Meier
committed suicide. While Drew’s actions were clearly morally wrongful,
particularly as she was aware that Meier suffered from depression,179 there
was no clear basis of legal liability under which Drew could be held

176
177
178
179

See following discussion.
Jacqueline Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, supra note 99, at ___.
Id., at ___.
Id., at ___.
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responsible.180 Federal prosecutors ultimately hinged their case on a fairly
tortuous interpretation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.181 This
legislation was enacted in the early days of the personal computer
revolution to criminalize computer hacking– described in the legislation in
terms of exceeding authorized access to a computer system.182
In an attempt to apply the legislation to Drew’s actions, prosecutors
argued that Drew had exceeded her authorized access to the MySpace
computer system in creating the fake Josh Evans persona because
MySpace’s terms of service prohibited false identities.183 The prosecutors’
interpretation of the legislation failed because the judge was concerned that
such a reading of the statute would render it void for vagueness.184 In the
court’s view, it would be too difficult for anyone to be expected to know all
the terms of service of the various online platforms to which they
subscribed, sufficiently to avoid serious criminal liability.185
In the case of the suicide of eighteen year old Tyler Clementi in New
Jersey, courts will be faced with arguments in favor of novel applications of
state hate crimes laws in order to hold Clementi’s roommate and another
student criminally responsible for Clementi’s death.186
Clementi’s
180

Id., at ___.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C) & 1030(c)(2)(A) (relating to accessing a computer
system without authorization or in excess of authorization); United States v Drew, 259
F.R.D. 449 (2009).
182
18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C) & 1030(c)(2)(A).
183
Andrew M Henderson, High-Tech Words Do Hurt: A Modern Makeover Expands
Missouri’s Harassment Law to Include Electronic Communications, 74 MO. L REV 379,
393 (2009).
184
United States v Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 464 (2009) (“The pivotal issue herein is
whether basing a CFAA misdemeanor violation as per 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C) and
1030(c)(2)(A) upon the conscious violation of a website's terms of service runs afoul of the
void-for-vagueness doctrine. This Court concludes that it does primarily because of the
absence of minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement, but also because of actual notice
deficiencies. ….[T]erms of service which are incorporated into a browsewrap or clickwrap
agreement can, like any other type of contract, define the limits of authorized access as to a
website and its concomitant computer/server(s). However, the question is whether
individuals of ‘common intelligence’ are on notice that a breach of a terms of service
contract can become a crime under the CFAA. Arguably, they are not.”).
185
Id., at 467 (“In sum, if any conscious breach of a website's terms of service is held
to be sufficient by itself to constitute intentionally accessing a computer without
authorization or in excess of authorization, the result will be that section 1030(a)(2)(C)
becomes a law that affords too much discretion to the police and too little notice to citizens
who wish to use the [Internet].’”)
186
John Culhane, More than the Victims: A Population-Based, Public Health
Approach to Bullying of LGBT Youth, 38 RUTGERS L. REC. 1 (describing the limitations of
current legislation in addressing bullying in situations like that involving Clementi’s
181
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roommate and the other student outed Clementi online by recording
homosexual encounters involving Clementi in his dorm room and posting
them online.187
Courts and legislators are now faced with issues of how to attach blame
to moral wrongs committed online that lead to grave physical harm in the
real world. There is currently great uncertainty as to which existing laws
might apply to these kinds of situations and, indeed, whether any current
laws are appropriately applied. It is likely that new tort and criminal laws
will need to be developed to tackle these challenges in the future.188 The
cyberlaw field is a good place to initiate inquiries about how to fit these
online wrongs into the legal matrix, and to develop substantive torts and
crimes that fit the moral wrongs currently ocurring online.
C. Quantifying Damage
Another challenge for cyberlaw in cases where novel kinds of harms
occur online is the problem of quantifying damages or ascertaining other
effective remedies. Many standard legal remedies – such as damages and
injunctions - do not work particularly well online. Injunctions are not
effective because it is impossible to meaningfully remove harmful
information from the Internet. There is a disturbingly permanent quality to
online information.189 An order to remove information from one website, or
even from multiple websites, will not result in the removal of the
information from the Internet entirely. Additionally, it is difficult to
quantify a damages order that can make a plaintiff whole where that
plaintiff is likely to suffer consequences of the online damage for the rest of
her life due to the permanent and global quality of online information.
Of course, one might argue that society will eventually stop taking
notice of online information, particularly information from an individual’s

Suicide).
187
Id., at para. 2 (“Tyler Clementi is dead because the internet dissemination of videos
showing him in an intimate setting with another man was too much for him to bear. He
jumped off the George Washington Bridge.”)
188
Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, supra note 99, at ___ (advocating legal
reform alongside developments in other regulatory mechanisms such as social norms and
market forces to protect individuals from online bullying and harassment).
189
Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”, supra note 129, at 977 (describing the impossibility
of removing all iterations of a given image from the Internet); SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF
REPUTATION, supra note 166, at 4 (“Information that was once scattered, forgettable, and
localized is becoming permanent and searchable.”)
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distant past.190 The argument runs that because eventually everyone will
have something embarrassing online, it will become the norm to expect this
kind of information and to ignore it.191 One may also argue that an
aggrieved person should be responsible for pro-actively making access to
damaging information more difficult even if it cannot be completely
eradicated from the Internet. For example, the victim could utilize a service
like Reputation.com to help sanitize her online reputation.192 Assuming that
society becomes more blasé about online reputation and that individuals can
act to protect their own online reputations, there may ultimately be no role
for the law in this context.
That may be true for the future. However, at the present time people are
losing jobs and suffering reputational and emotional damage as a result of
morally questionable online postings.193 Today’s law should play a role in
protecting those damaged by harmful online communications. Current
caseloads demonstrate that private individuals are relying on the law to
vindicate their personal reputations and emotional well being. The recent
AutoAdmit litigation in the United States is a case in point.194 In this case,
two female law students refused to stand by while they were embarrassed,
defamed, and humiliated on a bulletin board.195 The British case involving
190

SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 166, at 49 (“perhaps generations
in the future will no longer expect much privacy. One might envision a future where we
can finally be uninhibited and honest about ourselves. When everybody’s wants are
exposed, maybe people will stop readily condemning others, and the social norms that
people enforce yet secretly transgress will gradually fade away.”).
191
Id.
192
See Reputation.Com, Reputation.Com Helps Businesses and Consumers Control
Their Online Lives (“The growth of the Internet has made managing your online reputation
online a necessity. Through proprietary technology we allow customers to monitor the web,
delete their personal information, and control how they look when searched online.),
available at: http://www.reputation.com/company, last viewed on August 3, 2011; see also
MICHAEL FERTIK and DAVID THOMPSON, WILD WEST 2.0: HOW TO PROTECT AND
RESTORE YOUR ONLINE REPUTATION ON THE UNTAMED SOCIAL FRONTIER (2010)
(describing ways in which an individual or business can monitor and control his or her
online reputation either with or without the help of a service such as reputation.com).
193
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 166, at 38 (“Employers are
looking at social network site profiles of prospective employees. Microsoft officials admit
to trolling the Internet for anything they can find out about people they are considering for
positions. After a promising interview with a college student for a summer internship
position, a company president checked the student’s Facebook profile. The student listed
his interests as ‘smokin’ blunts’ and having a lot of sex. He didn’t get the job …. Some big
corporations are using software to systematically monitor employee blogs.”)
194
Doe I and Doe II v Individuals, Whose True Names Are Unknown, Civil Action
No. 3:07 CV 909 (CFD), 2008 WL 2428206 (D. Conn. June 13, 2008).
195
Id.
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Max Mosley, the wealthy Formula One magnate, is another example of a
plaintiff suing for reputational and emotional damage caused by online and
offline breaches of his privacy.196 The Mosley case in particular involved a
detailed examination of the problem of quantifying damages in the case of
emotional and reputational harm outside of the more common defamation
context.197
It is not the aim of this article to resolve issues of how to quantify and
remedy online harms. The aim is rather to demonstrate the necessity of
accepting and reconceptualizing cyberlaw as a field within which these
kinds of issues can be debated. By understanding the nature of the Internet
as focusing on global intermediated information exchanges, one can begin
to better understand the challenges inherent in developing legal principles
appropriate to the online world. The manner in which people communicate
online, the global extent of those communications, their permanent quality,
and the specific types of harms that may result are all bound up with the
nature of cyberspace itself. We need a clear theoretical framework within
which to study these unique aspects of the Internet in order to develop
appropriate rules for identifying and remedying online wrongs. Cyberlaw is
the appropriate forum for these debates.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This article contends that cyberlaw is not, and arguably never should
have been, dismissed as a “law of the horse”. While it was unclear in the
early days of the Internet how the field would develop in terms of
substance, it is much clearer now that cyberlaw is, and should remain, a
distinct field. The benefits of recognizing and developing cyberlaw as a
field derive from the fact that there are aspects of the Internet that create
unique legal challenges. The Internet is, above all else, a tool for global
communications. All Internet interactions are information exchanges, and
all of those exchanges are enabled by one or more intermediaries. Most of
these exchanges have a permanent and global quality that can ultimately
result in significant personal and reputational harms.
A field of cyberlaw will comprise legal issues that arise out of the
unique nature of the Internet. It will include a detailed consideration of the
legal responsibilities of Internet intermediaries of all kinds and in many
196

Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd, [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [2008]
E.M.L.R. 20 (Eng.).
197
Id., at para 212-231 (describing difficulties of quantifying damages in privacy
infringement cases involving emotional and reputational harm).
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contexts. However, it must also incorporate jurisdictional considerations,
the relationship between legal rules and online norms, the identification of
remediable online harms, and the ability to develop effective and apropriate
remedies for those harms. The cyberlaw field will overlap with other more
traditional bodies of law such as tort, contract, criminal law, constitutional
law, and intellectual property law. However, a consideration of problems
common to the Internet within the cyberlaw field will lead to more
principled, systematic and effective legal developments.
While debates about the nature of cyberspace and about the ability of
national governments effectively to regulate cyberspace have continued
since the dawn of the Internet, the debate about the nature of cyberlaw as a
field has stalled. It is now time to revive this debate. The Web 2.0 era has
broadened the reach of the Internet by enhancing how, and how often, we
interact online. We are no longer relatively passive consumers of online
information.
Rather, we increasingly participate in creation and
dissemination of content, often causing harm to others in the process. As
more and more people interact with each other online at an exponential rate,
it is imperative that a cyberlaw field can be developed and organized in a
way that reflects the realities of the Web 2.0 generation. Whatever the
nature of cyberlaw in the past, it is now time for a Cyberlaw 2.0.

